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FOREWORD
Professor Brent Fisse
Director, Institute of Criminology, Convenor of Seminar.
Few social issues have pricked the Australian conscience as much as
organized crime. The nature and scope of organized crime, however, remain
elusive despite the efforts of numerous commissions of inquiry, investigative
journalists, and legal commentators. The tumult has led to the development of
a much-vaunted institution, the crime commission, and a multitude of ideas
for reducing the proverbial “Mr Big” to size. How well these solutions will or
might work is hard to say, partly because of the difficulty in pinning down the
exact goals of enforcement, and partly because we are still at an experimental
stage in the design of countermethods. The offerings in the present volume
reappraise the state of organized crime and provide insights which are as timely
as they are provocative.
The ﬁrst paper, by Mr Frank Costigan, Q.C., sets out the reﬂections of one
of Australia’s foremost generals in the war against organized crime. After
reviewing the nature of “organized crime” and its close connection with white
collar crime, Mr Costigan stresses the prime importance of the money trail in
uncovering large-scale fraud and malfeasance. This ﬁscal “window into
organized crime”, it is argued, is of greater investigative worth than the
Australia Card, which is seen as an “intellectual and political aberration”. But
will the crooked money trail in fact be followed by our enforcement agencies?
In response to this key question, Mr Costigan highlights the importance of a
concerted national enforcement effort, and concludes on the depressing note that
state politics may block the way.
The second leading contribution, by Dr Grant Wardlaw, tackles the
assumptions which underlie prevailing “law and order” strategies for the control
of organized crime in relation to drugs. These assumptions are challenged and
rejected as spurious. The author argues that it is pointless to respond to the
drug problem with an overdose of law enforcement. What is needed, it is urged,
is a deeper theoretical and empirical understanding of drug markets and a
program of social control which reﬂects that understanding. From this
standpoint, there should be much less resort to the blunt instrument of the
criminal law and far greater reliance on strategies geared directly to reducing
the market demand for the commodity.
The third major paper, by Mr Matthew Goode, addresses the difﬁculties
posed by the sanction of conﬁscation of illicit profits. This sanction has now
been widely adopted as a measure to help combat organized crime, doubtless
because of its superﬁcial appeal. Beneath the surface, however, lurks much
potential for injustice, including the risk of innocent fish being caught by the
dragnet of forfeiture. Mr Goode’s account of the dangers, together with his
prescription for the safeguards necessary to overcome them, suggest that the
sanction may ultimately prove to be more trouble than it is worth.
The papers and comments to follow reveal a spectacular diversity of
opinion but this is to be expected in the wilderness of organized crime.
Ultimately what shines through these proceedings is not so much despair but
refusal to yield to the inglorious uncertainties of the topic. This is encouraging
because it contradicts the popular and cynical view that we as a nation are so
apathetic that we get the organized criminals we deserve.
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CONTROL OF ORGANISED CRIME WITH REFLECTIONS
ON SYDNEY
Frank Costigan Q. C.
Having resumed private life in the latter part of 1984 with a good deal of
relief it is with a sense of déja vu that I now ﬁnd myself once again speaking
in pubic on the subject of organized crime.
'When I was approached by Professor Fisse from the Institute of
Criminology to address this seminar, I hesitated for some time whether I would
accept his complimentary invitation. That hesitation was based on the
limitations on my freedom to speak freely and accordingly whether I could make
a useful contribution. -I think it important that I should spell out the reasons
for that hesitation as they explain the rather general nature of the comments I
will make in the substantive part of this speech.
As you know I spent four years and three months as a Royal Commissioner
investigating a variety of activities in this country. During that time I delivered
ﬁve Interim Reports and one Final Report totalling some 4 000 pages. When I
handed in my Final Report I returned my Letters of Commission. That was
the end of my appointed task. The facts I had detailed, the conclusions I had
come to, and the recommendations I had made were now the property of my
commissioning Governments. It was entirely for them to decide what should
be published and what should not be published. That is still their role. Likewise
it is for them to decide whether my recommendations are accepted or not.
I have taken the view, which I still hold, that it would be quite inconsistent
with my role as a Royal Commissioner to enter any public debate about the
matters contained in my Report or the way in which I conducted my inquiry
or the facts which I gathered together in the course of that inquiry. Moreover
I accepted my task as Commissioner in my capacity as a member of the Bar
and there are very clear ethical rules protective of one’s client which forbid a
barrister from speaking publicly about his brief. There were times, particularly
in the early weeks after my Commission ﬁnished, when I was at a considerable
disadvantage in the public debate by virtue of these rules. So be it. The rules
of the profession transcend any individual embarrassment.
I have mentioned these matters so that you will understand why it is that
any contribution I make to a seminar of this kind cannot be based by me on a
recital of detailed facts of which I am aware because of my investigations. Nor
will I respond to any questions directed to those inquiries or my methods of
conducting them.
Accordingly I am asked to speak tonight, subject to those limitations, on
the subject of organized crime. And I am to do so in twenty or so minutes.
That will be no easy task.
Let me spend ﬁrstly a few minutes on the deﬁnition of organized crime.
The use of that phrase for many people brings to mind Chicago of the
19205 and matters of that ilk. Of course that is a facet of organized crime but
the creature goes far beyond that. To talk of organized crime these days without
devoting a good deal of time to white collar crime is to refuse to face facts. The
American experience has demonstrated beyond argument that those organizers
ll
 
who make extraordinary proﬁts out of criminal activities invest a good deal of
that income in so-called legitimate business. So it is that banking, transport and
even pizza parlours in the United States have criminal ownership and control.
It comes as no surprise to ﬁnd that the new investors in their new activities
make use of the same illegal methods which have proved so successful in the
past; to pay tax would be a grievous loss of face, to pay heed to the requirements
of the Companies Act would be an infernal nuisance, and to have any regard
for their customers, the public or their competitors would not cross their minds.
That is not to say that all white collar crime is part of organized crime. It
certainly is not. There are still plenty of individual entrepreneurs who are
prepared to chance their arm and defy the law; with them the ordinary processes
of the law have to cope. However when you add the practices and amorality of
the new investing criminal a different dimension of approach is needed.
It is these kind of considerations which cast doubts on the value of the
phrase ‘organized crime’. That phrase is intended to deﬁne a problem which is
perceived in historical terms, and when so perceived raises the legitimate
questions considered by Grant Wardlaw in his paper. I suspect that organized
crime is a description we will have to live with whether we like it or not.
Perhaps no great harm will come from that provided it is understood that it
encompasses a far wider range of activity than the traditional model and in
particular involves movement into the white collar and ﬁnanical area.
In his papers on organized crime delivered at ANZAAS Perth in 1983
Douglas Meagher Q.C. referred to the description of organized crime set out in
the 1965 Report of the Conference on Organized Crime. It was:
Organized crime is a product of a self-perpetuating criminal
conspiracy to wring exorbitant proﬁts from our society by any means—
fair or foul, legal and illegal. It survives on fear and corruption. By one or
another means it obtains a high degree of immunity from the law. It is
totalitarian in organization. A way of life, it imposes rigid discipline on
underlings to do the dirty work while the top men of organized crime are
generally insulated from the criminal act and the consequent danger of
prosecution.
Meagher had this to say about the description:
This deﬁnition is one which appeals. It picks up certain facets of
organized crime which will be found common to all deﬁnitions produced
in America and elsewhere. They are these:
1. The criminal activities are ‘organized’ as distinct from isolated.
Spontaneous criminal acts, even by a group of people, are not
a manifestation of organized crime.
2. The organization is self-perpetuating. There is persistence in
the criminal activities (varied though they may be). It
continues not for a matter of days or weeks, but for years.
3. The motive is ﬁnancial proﬁt, though at times the desire for
power may appear to be of greater moment. Even on those
occasions, on closer analysis it can be seen that the desire for
power is to allow the accumulation of greater proﬁt or the
protection of wealth already won.
4. It has, as its goal, particular business activities. It stiﬂes
outside competition.
 5. The top men are insulated from the criminal act and the
consequent danger of prosecution. They have immunity.
6. It promotes fear and corruption.
I agree with that analysis.
Perhaps a major difference between organized and unorganized crime is
that in the former there is a public perception, which is quite accurate, that the
top man does not get caught.
Because of the vastness of this subject I propose to do no more than deal
with a number of separate aspects of it.
The area of organized crime which is of most concern to the community
involves the movement and manipulation of very large sums of money. The
drug trade is one obvious example. When I delivered the J. V. Barry Memorial
Lecture in 1983 I had something to say about that. I said:
The ﬁrst thing to remember is that the organization of crime is
directed towards the accumulation of money and with it, power. The
possession of the power that ﬂows with great wealth is to some people an
important matter in itself, but this is secondary to the prime aim of
accumulating money. Two conclusions ﬂow from this fact. The ﬁrst is that
the most successful method of identifying and ultimately convicting major
organized criminals is to follow the money trail. The second is that once
you have identiﬁed and convicted them you take away their money; that
is, the money which is the product of their criminal activities. Both these
conclusions have now been accepted in both the United States and the
United Kingdom and other western countries.
There has been a good deal of talk, to which I have contributed, of the
need to follow the money trail. It must be remembered that there are two
elements involved in that concept.
The ﬁrst is that you follow the trail in order to locate and identify the
monies or other assets which are the product of the criminal activity. This is a
very important and salutary exercise. Matthew Goode in his seminar paper on
the conﬁscation of criminal proﬁts has dealt with some of the many difﬁculties
which need to be resolved in this area. This technique is of great importance
in the ﬁght against organized crime not only as a matter of justice in retrieving
for the beneﬁt of wronged citizens and the community in general the proceeds
of the criminal activity but also to act as a deterrent to those high on the ladder
who are mainly involved as ﬁnanciers. The conviction of one or two of such
persons together with the seizure of those assets which are related to the receipt
of criminal proceeds would have a signiﬁcant deterrent effect on other would-
be entrepreneurs.
The second element is however, in my view, of far greater importance.
Criminals who acquire large fortunes are forced to use traditional ﬁnancial and
legal institutions both for convenience and in order by laundering to give
apparent legitimacy to their assets. No matter how skilful and deceptive they
may appear to be they leave a trail which can be followed. This provides a great
opportunity to the investigator. I do not pretend it is easy. But it can be done
and hard evidence can be produced. Moreover, because such transactions are
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demonstrably artiﬁcial when located, an explanation is required by those
performing them of their nature.
Let me give an example. A person wants to bring back into the country
some money which he has acquired fraudulently and which he has previously
sent out for laundering purposes. He sets up a company structure in say
Singapore: he gives the company an impressive name which includes words like
“international” or “ﬁnance” and then enters into an agreement to borrow
money from that company. By well known techniques such a company can have
an issued capital of say $50,000,000, although its real capital may be only $2.
On the surface it is no more than an ordinary commercial transaction. Beneath
the surface it is a fraud. It will not stand up to investigation. A reﬁnement on
this kind of operation is not to bother with sending money out of the country
and then bringing it in again: you merely have a lawyer prepare some extensive
documentation which Says you have done all those things.
In the result the criminal has access to substantial funds which have all
the appearances of legitimacy but none of the substance. He appears to be
untouchable but in reality he is quite vulnerable to a skilled investigator.
What is often forgotten in these discussions, particularly among lawyers,
is the distinction which must be drawn between the techniques to be applied
to an investigation and gathering of intelligence on the one hand and the
proving a case in court on the other. When a person is charged with a crime
he is entitled to expect that the Crown case will be supported by hard admissible
evidence to be tested by accepted legal principles. That is his ultimate security.
The process of investigation is a much earlier step normally commenced when
there is no target and often when there is no clear idea of what charges, if any,
will be laid. An investigation is concerned with the collection of hard evidence
but the process of investigation will often be assisted by leads and information
which have to be tested by various means.
Let me recall the time when foreign exchange controls were lifted in this
country. I have no criticism of that decision and indeed it was widely applauded
by those who know a great deal more about economics than I do. It was done
at a time when there was a great deal of Government and Taxation Department
activity in the recovery of tax evaded and avoided. Many of those involved in
the schemes were apprehensive that they would lose a great deal of money when
their time came. I have no doubt at all that a good deal of the money which
went out of this country during the six months after the controls were lifted
represented money on which tax had not been paid or which was the product
of criminal activities.
This represents a great opportunity for the investigator. The documents
are there to be looked at and dissected. What is needed is a small team based
from the Tax Department to go to the Reserve Bank and the private banks and
look at the documents. If there should be any reluctance on the part of these
bodies to co-operate appropriate powers could be invested in the team to require
their co-operation.
What I would expect to ﬁnd from such an exercise would be a
comparatively large number of persons and companies who owed a good deal
of tax. Moreover I would expect to ﬁnd a good deal of money whose source the
owners would ﬁnd difﬁcult to explain. In one of my reports I used the expression
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“a window into organized crime”. I would regard the exercise I have suggested
as a valuable window into the ﬁnancial techniques which are essential to the
leaders of organized crime.
Such an exercise would be comparatively cheap. It would have none of
the problems, a fraction of the cost and I suspect a much greater return than '
the intellectual and political aberration of the Australia Card.
Let me repeat what I said at the beginning of this section. The major role
of following the money trail is not the receiving of funds (important though
that is) but as an unequalled tool of investigation and intelligence. As those who
advise the people we are discussing know full well, more can be found from the
close scrutiny of documents and money movements than a month’s examination
in a witness box.
I now turn to a subject closer to home.
It is not possible or responsible to discuss the problem of organized crime
in Australia without reference to the unique problems of New South Wales and
Sydney in particular. There are a number of reasons for this.
In the ﬁrst place there is a general perception both in Australia and
overseas that Sydney is the centre of major crime in Australia and that over
many decades corruption has become institutionalized. When I was in London
in December, 1984 the BBC televised on its Panorama program a documentary
titled “Scandal Down Under”. The program has not been shown in Australia
and I accept there are good reasons why it cannot be shown for some time. It
presented an image of this country and Sydney in particular which is horrifying.
For the purpose of these comments it is irrelevant whether the facts shown in
that program are true or not. Indeed I speciﬁcally withold any adoption of the
program or of the material contained in it. But what I do say is that the program
would have undoubtedly created an impression in the minds of viewers that
corruption is rife in this city and this country and at high levels.
What is signiﬁcant about this is that for most people overseas the urban
vision of Australia is focused on Sydney. And that is understandable. Sydney
is undoubtedly one of the most beautiful and exciting cities in the world. Its
magniﬁcent harbour, its climate, the Opera House and its many other features
combine to make it a world class city. People overseas assume that what
happens in Sydney is representative of the rest of the country. That image
accordingly is a matter of legitimate concern to other Australians.
In the second place organized crime is not localized. It pays no heed to
State or National boundaries. This is not only because its operations will
normally span more than one jurisdiction; there is often a deliberate intent,
particularly in the ﬁnancial aspects, to involve as many States and countries as
possible so as to make more difﬁcult the investigation and collection of
evidence. The Federal Attorney-General, Lionel Bowen, has a clear
understanding of this and deserves high praise for his efforts on the international
level. This overlapping jurisdiction has the consequence that residents in, and
governments of other States have a real and legitimate interest in what is
happening in Sydney; and vice versa. It is not a State but a national problem.
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The matters I have just raised would suggest that there would be no
difﬁculty in activating interstate cooperation to deal with this Australia-wide
problem. But the contrary is the reality. The public statements of Government
reﬂect a stern determination to take serious steps. Such statements are not
surprising: every public ﬁgure is against drugs and for motherhood.
However, when you test these statements against what is being done you
are left with a feeling of despair. In Victoria an Inquiry into casinos was
painstakingly conducted by Xavier Connor Q.C. How anyone could read the
conclusions contained in that Report and decide to introduce legal casinos into
Sydney to replace (so it is said) those which have existed illegally and publicly
for so long is a matter of concern; this concern is enhanced by the enthusiasm
associated with its introduction.
What is even more disturbing, I believe, is the recent enactment of
legislation in New South Wales to set up a State Drug Commission. This
Commission epitomizes the dangers I spoke of a few minutes ago. It reﬂects a
determination that the investigation of any drug-related offence in New South
Wales shall remain the province of that State. It is a clear warning to others to
keep out. I remember when I attended the National Crime Summit the
Attorney-General of New South Wales, the late Paul Landa, whom I had never
met, went to some trouble to ﬁnd me in a crowded room to make it clear to
me that he and his Government would not allow outsiders to look at matters
in his State. This conversation was said to be in the context of the proper
structure of a National Crime Commission and not in any way related to my
Commission. The philosophy behind those remarks ﬁnds full expression in the
State Drug Commission Act.
The Act appears to be modelled on the National Crime Authority Act and
accordingly contains many of its defects. In general terms the Commission is
to investigate matters which have been referred to it by the Management
Committee. This Committee, partly political, cannot refer a matter to the
Commission if it considers that ordinary police methods are likely to be
effective. This provision matches a similar requirement in the National Crime
Authority Act. Clearly no matter will be referred to the N.C.A. if it does not
meet that test. If the committee is satisﬁed that ordinary police methods are
not likely to be effective it will refer it to the State Commission. It will never
be referred to the N.C.A., although that body may be given some information
about it pursuant to section 7.
What the New South Wales Government has done by this legislation is to
emasculate the N.C.A. It has told it by statute that there will be no reference
for investigation of any matter involving drug activity in New South Wales.
I have made no secret of my views that the legislation setting up the N.C.A.
has serious defects; but despite those views it is clear that the establishment of
that body is a major step forward. It is also clear beyond rational argument that
there are many activities which can be investigated only by a national body. Of
the ﬁrst priority among such activities are drug related matters.
To place a Berlin wall around this State can advantage only those who wish
to continue operating within it to the detriment of the whole Australian
community.
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Accordingly the New South Wales Government has by its legislation and
its attitudes caused enormous harm to the ﬁght against organized crime in this
country. It has failed to respond in any rational manner to the clear evidence
available to it of the problems present in this State.
Unless there is some dramatic change historians will conclude that the
single most serious reason why organized crime continues to ﬂourish in this
country lies in this failure.
One of the difﬁculties the Commonwealth and Victorian Governments had
in deciding what sections of my reports should be made public arose from the
quite proper desire not to cause interference with current investigations and,
even more important, not to prejudice in any way current or potential trials. A
similar constraint aﬂ‘eCts me and partly explains why so much of the writing
on this subject is done in historical terms. The history however keeps advancing.
A series of reports from Moffatt, Woodward, Williams and Stewart together with
my own reports all paint a similar picture. The close relationship forged over
decades between people of political, commercial and criminal inﬂuence remain
a public scandal. In another area, although recent Police Commissioners, to
whom I pay tribute, have made serious efforts to improve both the image and
the performance of the police force much remains to be done.
I conclude therefore on a note of depression. There are many dedicated
people of every political persuasion and spanning all social classes who are
concerned to see that our traditional liberties and life style are not eroded or
eliminated by the greed of those who control and proﬁt by the activities of
organized Crime. Many of these people live in this State. They cannot achieve
their aim without the help of Government. They have waited too long for such
help.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT*
Dr Grant Wardlaw
Senior Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology
There is a growing official and popular literature which purports to document
the existence of organized crime in Australia and, in particular, its grip on the
importation and distribution of drugs in this country‘. The effect of this work,
sensationalized and ampliﬁed both by some of the authors themselves and by
the media, has been to create a climate of fear and panic which sees organized
crime as a monolithic entity or series of entities progressively seizing unto
themselves economic and political power. Much of what passes for analysis of
organized crime in Australia is expressed in terms of metaphors and analogies,
usually tinged with a highly moralistic tone. Notably lacking are empirical
studies (admittedly very difﬁcult to conduct), conceptual clarity and, most of
all, a clear deﬁnition of what exactly constitutes organized crime. The result is
that while most people would agree with the proposition that there is organized
crime in Australia and that it is an interesting problem which demands different,
better or more law enforcement resources devoted to combating it, there is no
clear agreement about the precise nature and extent of the problem or about
the appropriate strategies for dealing with it.
Deﬁning Organized Crime and Drug Abuse '
The question of the deﬁniton of organized crime is central to any
discussion of the phenomenon. But it is precisely this question which is evaded
both by those who discuss the nature of the problems caused by organized crime
and by those who propose solutions. Clearly there is signiﬁcant criminality in
Australia. Some of it is sophisticated and/or on a large scale. There are linkages
between some forms of crime and between some criminal ﬁgures. But how much
of it can be classiﬁed as organized crime? How can we know that (or if)
organized crime is increasing unless we have a generally-agreed deﬁnition which
tells us what we are measuring? This is not to deny that organized crime exists
or that it is a serious social and law enforcement problem. But being aware of
the lack of a solid deﬁnitional and conceptual basis for our discussions of
organized crime should make us very wary of claims couched in emotive or
moralistic tones and of suggested remedies ﬂowing from them that involve
radical departures from traditional standards and limitations on powers. By all
means let us consider new concepts of investigation, prosecution, and
* The views expressed are personal ones and should not be construed as the ofﬁcial position
of the Australian Institute of Criminology.
' See, for example, Australian Royal Commission of lnquiry into Drugs, Report (AGPS,
Canberra. 1980) (hereafter cited as Williams, 1980); Bob Bottom, Without Fear or Favour
(Sun Books, Melbourne, 1984), Connections: Crime Rackets and Networks of Influence
Down-Under (Sun Books, Melbourne, 1985); Alfred W. McCoy, Drug Trafﬁc.- Narcotics
ana’ Organized Crime in Australia (Harper and Row, Sydney, 1980); Douglas Meagher,
Q.C., Organized Crime. Papers presented to the 53rd ANZAAS Congress, Perth, Western
Australia 16-20 May, 1983, (AGPS, Canberra, I983); Athol Molﬁtt, A Quarter to Midnight.
The Australian Crisis: Organized Crime and the Decline ofthe Institutions ofState (Angus
and Robertson, Sydney, I985); New South Wales Royal Commission into Drug Trafﬁcking,
Report (N.S.W. Government Printer, Sydney, 1979) (hereafter cited as Woodward, 1979);
Royal Commission of lnquiry into Drug Trafﬁcking, Report, (AGPS, Canberra, 1983)
(hereafter cited as Stewart, I983); and Royal Commission on the Activities of the
Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union, Final Report, (AGPS, Canberra, 1984)
(hereafter cited as Costigan, 1984).
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punishment, but let us ensure that the changes we make are based on an
accurate analysis of speciﬁc problems and not on the assumption that we are
ﬁghting some generalized evil of awesome power, which will surely engulf us
unless we take extraordinary steps to protect ourselves. Because such caution
is often misinterpreted, let me again emphasize that I am not opposed to
increased or novel powers per se, nor to increase in law enforcement capabilities
and budgets. My plea is merely that such changes as we make in these directions
are reasoned responses which are as precisely targeted as possible.
If organized crime is a subject surrounded by deﬁnitional confusion, beset
by problems of measurement, and characterized by emotionalism, irrationality
and fear, then the subject of drug abuse is even more so. It is difficult to think
of an issue that arouses such strong emotions and inhibits to such a degree
rational consideration of all of the various policy options which might be
proposed as part of a drug control strategy. This is particularly true of the issues
surrounding drug trafﬁcking. As with organized crime, drug abuse suffers from
confusion over basic concepts and deﬁnitions. Is there such a thing as addiction?
What is an addictive substance? How (if at all) do we label an individual as an
addict? Is there a progression from one type of drug to another? Are there causal
connections between drug use and crime and, if so, what are their natures?
Precise measurement of the nature and extent of the use of illicit drugs is an
extremely difﬁcult undertaking. In Australia, we lack even the most rudimentary
data base (particularly that involving compatable time series data) which would
allow the production of estimates of incidence and prevalence of use of
particular drugs of concern. Such estimates as have been made are so clearly
methodologically ﬂawed as to allow no conﬁdence to be placed in themz.
In spite of having no clear picture of the dimensions of illegal drug use
and in spite of our woeful lack of knowledge about the nature of the various
markets for illegal drugs in Australia we, as a society, feel conﬁdent that the
situation is “extremely serious” and may be even “out of control”, and that
enforcement of drug laws should be the primary mechanism for reducing illicit
drug use. Some contributors to the public debate (especially politicians and
spokespersons for law enforcement agencies) believe, or speak as if they believe,
that drug enforcement can virtually eliminate illicit drug use if only sufﬁcient
resources and powers were to be given to the enforcement agencies.
The Organized Crime/Drug Nexus
The currency accorded to the view that the primary position in a drug
control strategy properly belongs to drug enforcement is increased by the
common view that organized crime plays a large part, if not the controlling part,
in drug trafficking This is in spite of the fact that the commonly held notion
of organized crime as a centrally organized, hierarchical, power-grabbing entity
with reasonably stable structures clearly is not descriptive of a very signiﬁcant
portion of Australian drug markets. 3 Such evidence as is available indicates the
2 For detailed discussion and comparison of estimates of drug use, expenditure on illicit
drugs. etc.. in Australia, see Ian D. Elliott, ‘Heroin: Mythologies for Law Enforcers’.
Criminal Law Journal, 1982, 6, pp. 6—43; ‘Heroin Myths Revisited: the Stewart Report'.
Criminal Law Journal. 1983, 7, pp. 333—345; ‘Heroin in Australia: the Costs and
Consequences of Prohibition’, Journal ofDrug Issues, in press.
3 The four most recent Royal Commissions into drug matters whose terms of reference
inclined them to examine primarily law enforcement aspects of drug use all acknowledge
the reality of this view in some fashion; but all, in their own ways, seem to make light of
it in arriving at their ﬁnal conclusions and recommendations. See, Costigan, 1984; Stewart,
I983: Williams, 1980; and Woodward, I979.
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presence of a considerable number of individual entrepreneurs, and many (may
be most) of the “organizations” involved in the importation and distribution
of drugs do not conform, even in general terms, to basic characteristics said to
distinguish organized crime.4 Evidence from Royal Commission hearings and
from anecdotal sources indicates that there are many organizations involved in
the drug trade in Australia, they are often ﬂoating groups which form and
reform, and many have a tendency towards decentralization. The drug industry
is fragmented, basically uncoordinated, consists of different and changing
numbers of levels for different drug markets and involves constant changes of
personnel (albeit with some important constancies in personnel).
These characteristics are not those supposed to deﬁne organized crime.
Why then, is the belief so strong that organized crime is so central to drug
trafﬁcking in Australia? There are a number of possible reasons. The ﬁrst, of
course, is that it is simply true. It is possible to argue that in spite of the
fragmentation and lack of organization (in the sense implied by the term
“organized crime”) which exists in Australian markets for illegal drugs, the
operations of organized crime accounts for the major share of the markets, or
soon will do if they continue to expand their power and market control. To
sustain this argument, however, its proponents must fall back onto
“impression”, “intelligence estimates”, and “operational experience”—all valid
and important contributors to the drugs debate but not, I suggest, sufﬁcient to
paint an accurate picture which can be accepted widely with conﬁdence. This
picture lacks the detail which would be provided by clear deﬁnition of terms,
adequate measurement of drug use indicators and analysis of the structure and
dynamics of drug markets. We cannot, therefore, dismiss the notion that
organized crime controls a major (and increasing) share of drug trafﬁcking—.—
but neither can we accept it uncritically. I, for one, remain unconvinced that
organized crime (in the sense of relatively stable, sophisticated enterprises
possessing some deﬁned structure and employing violence and corruption to
further their power) plays the major role in Australia’s drug trafﬁcking scene.
The second reason for the strength of the belief in the importance of
organized crime to drug trafﬁcking, certainly in the public mind, is the type of
coverage given to both drugs and organized crime by the media. This coverage
often is sensationalist in nature, blurs important distinctions, has the tone of a
moral crusade about it and is heavily inﬂuenced by American stereotypes which
portray organized crime as a Maﬁa-type conspiracy centred on some ethnic
grouping. The keenness with which the Autralian media have promoted stories
about the Calabrian community and the "L '0n0rata Societa" in connection with
the illicit marijuana industry in the Grifﬁth area are testimony to this tendency.
Such reporting has tended to foster a very simplistic view of organized crime,
and one which again involves a largely moralistic stance this time with
ethnically discriminatory overtones. This view has itself been subjected to
4 As stated earlier, there is no commonly accepted deﬁnition of organized crime which is
precise enough to provide much guidance as to what activities or patterns of behaviour
should be so labelled. However, there are a number of characteristics which appear in
many deﬁnitions which might indicate (when present in some combination) the existence
of organized crime. The characteristrics are corruption, violence, sophistication, continuity,
structure, discipline, multiple enterprises, and involvement in legitimate enterprises. See
Michael D. Maltz. ‘Toward Deﬁning Organized Crime’ in H. E. Alexander and G. E.
Caiden (eds), The Politics and Economics ofOrganized Crime (Lexington Books, Lexington,
1985). pp. 21—35.
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vigorous criticism in recent years even in the United States, where major
criminal enterprises based on kinship and tradition are more frequent, obvious
and powerful.5 In addition, to the extent that organized crime in America does
follow the Maﬁa or La Cosa Nostra model, it does so largely because of features
of the social, economic and political structures of the United States which either
are not paralleled in Australia or should have much less impact on the
development of organized crime in this country. We should, thus, be wary of
borrowing models of organized crime developed elsewhere without checking that
comparable ciréumstances should make them appropriate in the local context.
A third factor, I believe, stems from our failure to deﬁne adequately the
term “organized crime”. In the absence of such a deﬁnition we may often simply
confuse criminal organization or sophistication with organized crime. As society
becomes more complex and as technologies open the way to new crimes or to
more sophisticated ways of committing old ones, so the nature of crime changes
too and almost by deﬁnition becomes more organized. Looked at this way, most
crime will eventually be organized crime. Surely this is not what we mean when
we seek to justify the introduction of the new powers or the creation of new
investigative agencies. Nevertheless, it seems to me that many of the cases,
particularly in the drug trafﬁcking ﬁeld, which are cited as evidence of the grip
of organized crime are evidence of nothing more than organization and
sophistication. To be sure this constitutes a serious law enforcement problem,
but one which does not carry the sinister implications of being “organized
crime”.
In spite of all these difﬁculties we are seeing an increasing tendency
amongst opinion moulders and decision makers to speak as if it is entirely clear
what the dimensions of the drug problem are and what the involvement of
organized crime is in it. The scenario is simple. Drug abuse is set to tear away
the basic values and fabric of our society. The situation has reached epidemic
proportions because of the increasing involvement of organized crime. The way
to stamp out both drug trafﬁcking and organized crime is to concentrate more
resources in the law enforcement sector and to introduce novel or extended
powers and harsher sentences. To be sure, we are also increasing education and
treatment resources, but one can’t help feeling that most faith is being placed
in drug enforcement. By linking drugs to organized crime, policy makers feel
able to justify to the public almost any powers or any increase in resources.
Nothing, of course, is done to deﬁne precisely what constitutes organized crime
or to demonstrate the exact nature of its relationship to the drug trade. As a
consequence, the public is left (or fed) with images of something akin to
sophisticated modern management structures, turned to the service of drug
running, with their power being maintained or increased by vicious criminal
violence of a type fundamentally different (and inherently more evil) from other
forms of crime.
5 See, for example, Gordon Hawkins, ‘God and the Maﬁa’, The Public Interest. No. l4,
Winter 1969, pp. 24—51; A. F. J. Ianni, A Family Business (Russell Sage Foundation, New
York, 1972); Peter Reuter, Disorganizea’ Crime: Illegal Markets and the Maﬁa (MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass, I983); Peter Reuter and Jonathon Rubenstein. ‘Fact, Fancy and
Organized Crime’, The Public Interest, No. 53, Fall 1978, pp. 45-67; Vicent F. Sacco,
‘An Approach to the Study of Organized Crime’ in R. A. Silverman and J. J. Teevan, Jr
(eds), Crime in CanadianSociety, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, Toronto, 1980), pp. 248-264.
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We, thus, find ourselves in a situation in which there has been no
comprehensive attempt to research and describe illicit drug markets in
Australia.6 In the absence of this information, we derive our hypotheses from
partial law enforcement or Royal Commission information,7 sensational media
treatment of the problem and overseas models (many of which, as argued above,
can be shown to be ﬂawed even in their original context and whose translation
to Australian conditions needs anyway to be viewed with a very critical eye).
As a consequence we are currently in the midst ofa “drug panic”, a panic which
looks largely to law enforcement to stem the ﬂow of illegal drug use.
Costs of a Prohibition Policy
Unfortunately, in turning to enforcement we must realize the irony that it
is the prohibition policy which we want to enforce which itself produces many
of the conditions which make use of illicit drugs so damaging. Making the drug
illegal drives up its price, which in turn forces some drug-users to commit
money-producing crimes in order to ﬁnance their habits. The high price of
illegal drugs makes the profits to be made from drug trafﬁcking very large indeed
and encourages more sophisticated and organized criminal individuals and
groups into the market as well as increasing the amount of violence employed
within the circle of drug users and trafﬁckers. The illegal context also means
that much drug use takes place in marginal social settings, thus associating drug
use with other undesirable features of contemporary life and bringing large
numbers of young people into contact with them. The necessity to administer
drugs covertly contributes to the health problems (such as hepatitis) associated
with drug use. Other medical complications (such as overdoses and the
morbidity and mortality which are a consequence of using adulterated drugs)
are directly associated with the illegal status of the substances.
In law enforcement terms alone, adopting an approach which over-
criminalizes drug use produces a myriad of negative consequences.8 In addition
to income-generating crime, it is obvious that the policy generates a high level
of other crininal activity which would not exist in its absence (e.g., murder,
assault, robbery, etc., associated with drug transactions, bribery of ofﬁcials,
contravention of financial regulations and currency laws, tax evasion, etc.)9
9 Such research would have to be conducted over a number of years in a number oflocations
and would involve locating and interviewing/observing many individuals who have not
come to ofﬁcial notice as well as those who are recorded in ofﬁcial statistics. An excellent
model of this type of research and of the types of data which may be collected is found
in the work of the New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services, especially their
Street Studies Unit. See Bruce D. Johnson et al., Taking Care of Business: The Economics
of Crime by Heroin Users (Lexington Books, Lexington, I985).
a By partial, I mean both that it is a view coloured by a particular perspective (sometimes
driven by organizational imperatives such as the need to argue for more funds or
personnel) and that it is fragmentary (in that many sources of information on the drug
scene are, surprisingly to many, not available to law enforcement agencies). To say that
the information is partial is not to criticize it or to imply that it is concocted for some
ulterior purpose. It is, indeed, a vital part of the mosaic. But we need to remember that
it is a mosiac.
8 A. W. Cohn, ‘Drugs. Crime, and Criminal Justice: State-of-the-Art and Future Directions',
Federal Probation. 1984. 48(3), pp. 13—24.
No doubt many ofthe individuals involved would commit similar crimes for other reasons
in the absence ofa drug factor. Obviously it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimatejust
how many would commit non-income producing crimes if they were not involved in drug
use or distribution.
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However, as a society, we have so far accepted that this is the price we have to
pay to prevent even more users entering the market for illegal drugs.
Undeniably, this acceptance has led to a whole range of derivative problems
within the criminal justice system, ranging from overloading court, prison and
probation systems to encouraging deviant and corrupt ofﬁcial behaviour and
engendering changes to our legal system which undermine some of its basic
precepts. In Australia, public perception of corruption associated with drug
enforcement and of drugs as the lifeblood of organized crime, together with the
disrespect for the law and for law enforcement agencies which ﬂows from
widespread disregard of the prohibitions against some forms of drug use
(particularly those involving cannabis) have reached such proportions that it is
not enough merely to assert that the negative impacts of prohibitionist policies
are something we must just accept in order to avoid the “drug problem” getting
entirely “out of hand”. We must now examine seriously how much drug
enforcement strategies are themselves contributing to the problems associated
with illegal drug use Even more important, we must ask whether drug
enforcement strategies of any kind have any signiﬁcant impact on illegal drug
use (especially in the medium- to long-term).
Evaluating Drug Enforcement Strategies: The Case of Cocaine
In order to evaluate the success of current moves to increase enforcement
powers and resources we must move beyond the grandiose claims of
enforcement agencies and look at a diverse range of data. An excellent starting
point is to examine the impact on cocaine importation into the United States
of the introduction of a number of highly resourced Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces. Following the success (in law enforcement terms) of
the ﬁrst Task Force established in 1982 in Florida under the supervision of Vice
President Bush, an additional twelve Task Forces have been activated. At the
end of 1984, Task Force Personnel included 215 Assistant US. Attorneys, l 076
drug enforcement agents and 41 1 support personnel.'° Total obligations for the
O.C.D.E. Task Force Program appropriation in 1984 were US$98 million.‘I The
mandate of the Task Forces is to ‘target, investigate and prosecute individuals
who organize, direct, ﬁnance, or are otherwise engaged in high level illegal drug
trafﬁcking enterprises, including large scale money laundering organizations’.‘2
The focus of investigative efforts is on traditional organized crime ﬁgures, major
outlaw motorcycle gangs, prison gangs or prison-associated organizations, and
criminal groups formed for the purpose of importing and/or distributing large
amounts of controlled substances, or which are ﬁnancing the foregoing in
addition to other non-drug criminal activity. The results seem impressive:
As of December 1984, the thirteen Task Forces had initiated 804 cases
resulting in 953 indictments initiating criminal charges against 3 468
individuals, 1 408 individuals had already been convicted and sentenced,
and ﬁnes, seizures and forfeitures exceeded $219 million.‘3
'0 Annual Report of (he Organized Crime Drug Enforcemem Task Force Program (Ofﬁce of
the Attorney General. Washington, DC, March 1985), pp. 9—10.
' ibid. p. ll9.
'3 ibid, p. 7.
'3 ibid. Attorney General’s covering letter.
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In terms of drugs seized, the Task Forces removed 214 kilograms of heroin,
13 282 kilograms of cocaine, and 503 386 kilograms of marijuana from the
marketplace.”
Such statistics have been claimed by the US. Administration to
demonstrate the success of the program. Up-to-date evaluations are not yet to
hand but examination of the record of the Florida Task Force indicates that
room for considerable scepticism exists.l5 An evaluation of the Task Force by
the US. General Accounting Ofﬁce16 found, that in terms of its impact on drug
markets, the Task Force was not the success it ﬁrst appeared to be. The G.A.O.
Report found that marijuana smuggling simply moved to other areas of the
country or was supplemented by expanded domestic production. Seizures in the
Task Force area increased by 86 per cent during the evaluation period, whilst
seizures in the Northeast region of the United States rose more than 400 per
cent over the same time. Although the Task Force succeeded in the partial
diversion of cocaine smuggling routes to other areas, high quality cocaine was
readily available in Miami at lower prices and higher purities than those
prevailing prior to the inception of the Task Force. Record drug seizures and
high arrest rates coincided, therefore, with greater availability of cocaine at
lower prices and higher purity. In addition a clear majority of the cocaine
offenders arrested were lower-level ﬁgures as judged by the US. Drug
Enforcement Administration’s classiﬁcation system. This contributes to the
public perception that major trafﬁckers are either too clever or too difﬁcult to
arrest, or have succeeded in gaining de facto immunity through political
connections and corruption of police and prosecuting authorities.
One could argue, of course, that the above evaluation was conducted too
early in the project’s life to enable a clear picture to emerge as to its eventual
success. This may be so, but the latest data on cocaine from the United States
indicate that even successes at the higher levels of the drug distribution network
may have little impact on retail sales (which, after all, are the real target of the
enforcement strategies). Thus, the Florida Cocaine Task Force'7 summary of
ﬁndings for February 1985 reported that availability, purity, intensity of use,
and adverse health consequences all increased, while price decreased for cocaine
available in Miami."3 Other cities report a generally similar pattern at the same
time as signiﬁcant increases in law enforcement activity targeted on cocaine.l9
In some parts of the country, increased drug enforcement has resulted in
increased wholesale prices for cocaine, but levels of availability are so high that
'4 ibitl. p, IOO.
'5 See, Steven Wisotsky. ‘Exposing the War on Cocaine: the Futility and Destructiveness of
Prohibition'. Wisconsin Law Review, I983, 6, pp. 1305—1426, for a thorough review and
discussion.
'6 US. General Accounting Ofﬁce. Report by the Comptroller General, Federal Drug
lntercliclion Eﬂ'orls Need Strong Central Oversight (G.A.O. Washington, DC, l3 June
1983).
'7 Not to be confused with the Florida Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, the
Florida Cocaine Task Force was created by the State of Florida in late I984 as a strategy
to combat the widespread effects of cocaine abuse.
'8 Community Epidemiology Work Group. Patterns and Trends in Drug Abuse: A National
and International Perspective (National Institute on Drug Abuse, Rockville. MD, June
1985).
'9 ibid.
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these changes have not resulted in higher retail prices or lower retail purities.20
The difficulty faced by drug enforcement, even at very concentrated levels, is
illustrated by the actual ﬁgures involved. The following quote from a DEA.
Special Report on cocaine tells the story:
By early 1984, cocaine had saturated the US. drug supply, causing
substantive wholesale price reductions in most US. cities. In Miami,
wholesale cocaine prices had dropped to as low as $16,000 per kilogram
in the spring of 1984, and to $30,000 in New York City. By the end of’
the year, however, kilogram prices had risen to between $33,000 and
$38,000 in Miami and between $40,000 and $45,000 in New York City,
but the national average of $40,000 to $50,000 was still below levels
reported from 1980 through 1982. Purity levels for kilogram quantities
continue at around 90 per cent, the same as in 1984.21
On a smaller, but no less important scale, the same phenomena may be
observed in Australia. Resources for drug enforcement at both State and Federal
levels have been increased substantially over the past few years. In New South
Wales, the increase has been dramatic with the creation of the Drug Law
Enforcement Bureau. At the same time we have seen the establishment of the
National Crime Authority and the N.S.W. Drug Crimes Commission. there has
been a move generally to increase penalties in drug legislation, with the most
extreme example being Queensland’s controversial Drugs Misuse Bill. Yet such
evidence as is available (and it is of a very poor quality in Australia) indicates
that all these initiatives are having little, if any, impact on drug markets and
drug use. Larger numbers of drug arrests (many at a higher level in the system
than in previous times), much larger seizures of illicit drugs, and an apparent
willingness of the courts to hand down longer sentences for major drugs crimes
all seem to have little effect. Heroin use appears reasonably static, cannabis use
remains widespread, and cocaine use appears to be increasing.22 Yet in spite of
the lack of detailed knowledge about the actual dimensions of the drug problem
and of the increasingly frequent admission by drug enforcement agencies that
it is not possible to make signiﬁcant inroads into the scale of drug abuse by
concentrating on enforcement strategies, there remains a strong belief that more
enforcement and harsher penalties will eventually result in the ‘defeat’ of the
‘drug monster’. As there is no convincing evidence from anywhere in the world
that an emphasis on supply reduction (drug enforcement) strategies has
signiﬁcant medium- to long-term impacts on the amount of illicit drug use, it
is difﬁcult to view our solutions and proposed solutions as rational ones. Surely,
they must be based on myths and fears and ignorance (since we cannot claim
to know much about drug use patterns or the magnitude of drug abuse in
Australia).
These considerations lead us to examine at a theoretical level whether any
drug enforcement policies are capable of having a signiﬁcant impact on illegal
drug use. Recent studies in the United States are not encouraging. Perhaps the
3" U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Special Report. Worldwide Cocaine Ti‘dﬁcking
Trent/s (Washington, DC. May 1985).
3' ibid. p. 22.
3 It is. frankly. difficult to be more precise about drug use trends in Australia due to the
inexcusable dearth of reliable collections of drug use indicator data. Individual states
collect data for speciﬁc purposes, but such projects are usually one-off efforts which provide
no trend information and the results of which often are not comparable with other studies.
I.‘
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best known and most comprehensive evaluation of drug enforcement strategies
conducted thus far is that undertaken by the Rand Corporation.23 This study
analysed the effects on drug markets of improvements in the following
enforcement strategies: .
(l) Controlling production of illicit drugs in source countries;
(2) Intensifying efforts to interdict or seize drugs and couriers as they
enter the country; ‘
(3) Succeding in incarcerating principals in major drug smuggling and
distribution networks; and
(4) Intensifying the enforcement of laws against low level retailers.
The analyses of these enforcement options revealed that each of the
alternatives would be unlikely to have signiﬁcant impact on illicit drug use even
if greatly increased resources were to be devoted to them.
Targeting High-level Trafﬁckers
Of the options listed above, one currently stands out as attracting more
political and public support, more resources, more drug enforcement agency
time and, possibly, greater powers for investigators. That option is targeting
high-level drug trafﬁckers. It is a policy which on the surface has much going
for it. Such individuals seem more morally blameworthy than others and thus
there is a great deal of satisfaction engendered by their capture: But it also seems
an eminently sensible policy. After all, one might expect that arrest of such
individuals would have a larger impact on the drug market than arrest of small-
time distributors or users. The question is, does the policy have the desired
effect in practice?
In order to produce any long-term impact on drug market by targeting its
upper levels, at least some of the following assumptions must be true (otherwise
the market will be able to adjust relatively rapidly to the removal of a dealer
and only localized, short-term market disruptions will be evident)?“
1. There are, at any one time, a relatively small number of high level
dealers. , ,
2. One can only become a high-level dealer by spending a substantial
amount of time in the trade.
3. High-level dealers stay in that position for a long period of time
unless removed by law enforcement or competitors.
4. The organizations operated by high-level dealers take a signiﬁcant
amount of time to assemble.
5. Such organizations are durable.
6. The organizations adapt slowly and/or expensively to changes in
enforcement tactics or strategies.
23 J. M. Polich. P. L. Ellickson, P. Reuter and J. P. Kahan. Strategies for Controlling
Adolescent Drug Use (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, I984).
3‘ The policy analysis discussed in this section of the paper was provided by Dr Peter Reuter.
Rand Corporation. Washington. DC.
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If it could be shown that these conditions obtain in markets for particular
drugs we could assume with some conﬁdence that removing some of the high-
level dealers and their close associates would signiﬁcantly reduce the capacity
of the drug distribution system to deliver drugs to wholesalers. One or more of
the following consequences would then obtain:
(1) Wholesale prices would rise;
(2) Supply would be reduced; and
(3) There would be more uncertainty in the supply, which would
reduce use by raising the margins sought by lower-level dealers and
also by making it more difﬁcult for users to maintain regular usage.
Unfortunately, there is an equally plausible set of assumptions based on
anecdotal evidence of market structures:
1. Many persons are sometimes high-level dealers (i.e., have the
opportunity to purchase and distribute large amounts of a selected
drug).
2. The requirements for becoming a high-level dealer are nothing more
than the experience of a few middle-level deals, which may be
gained in a few months.
3. Some high-level dealers leave the business when they have made a
substantial amount of money from a few successful deals. '
4. Organizations are readily assembled as ad hoc coalitions of persons
already in various aspects of the trade.
5. Such organizations form and reform quickly.
If these assumptions are valid, then obviously, the only consequence of
increased enforcement against high-level dealers and their organizations would
be to raise the risk to those in the trade and raise prices. Since only a relatively
small share of ﬁnal price is accounted for by the compensations of high-level
dealers”, this would not appear likely to have much effect on ﬁnal price.
Further, the amount by which the riskiness of high-level trafﬁcking can in reality
be increased, may be limited by the adaptability of importing and distributing
organizations.
Determining Directions for Enforcement Strategies
It seems to me that we need urgently to commission studies which will try
to determine which set of assumptions hold for drug markets in Australia before
deciding on vital policy questions such as what levels of a market to target, what
sort of drug enforcement agencies we need, and what powers we need to give
them. If urgent action is deemed necessary then we should make these decisions '
on the basis of whatever data are now available, but within a framework which
attempts to answer the question of what structures exist. We need, too, in our
35 Polich er al. (I984). Note. however. that this may not be so much the case in Australia.
Elliott (I983) op. cit. reminds us that ‘lf one accepts the analysis of the New South Wales
market given in the Woodward Report, the percentage return for investment at the import
and wholesale levels is high—considerably higher than the estimates for comparable
market levels in the United States. The gross proﬁt taken by the importers and wholesalers
is less than a third, however, of the estimated amount paid by users to buy heroin‘ (p.
38). This illustrates the importance of obtaining accurate Australian data upon which to
base our policy analyses.
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analyses to remember that markets for different illegal drugs have different
characteristics and cease talking about illegal drugs as if they constitute a unitary
phenomenon so that all drugs can be attacked in the. same manner with the
same likelihood of success. Because of differences in the structure of markets
and in elasticity of demand“, some enforcement techniques may have more
chance of success with some drugs than with others. Thus Reuter and Kleiman27
argue that, in the US. context, high-level heroin enforcement should be
allocated a larger share of resources and that devoted to high-level marijuana
and cocaine enforcement should be reduced. Their analysis of market forces also
suggests a rather controversial strategy change—that we should also reinvest
some resources further down the distribution chain in the heroin market and
attempt to reach all or most mid-level dealers. A recent study of targeted low-
level heroin enforcement in a medium-sized city, Lynn, Massachusetts,
concluded that removal of a small number of low-level dealers had succeeded
in eliminating an active regional street market”. In the study, burglaries fell 41
per cent year-to-year after the introduction of the task force which concentrated
entirely on retail heroin sales. The decreases in burglaries was more than four
times the average decline nationally, state-wide, and in other Massachusetts
areas with heroin problems. During the same period there was an increase of
90 per cent in demand for heroin treatment in Lynn. It is posited that this
“saturation” approach may have more impact than targeting higher up the chain
because we might presume that the lower-level dealers who are cut off from their
sources are less resourceful in finding alternatives than their higher-level
counterparts. Once again, this seems very plausible, but we need detailed
information on the operation of Australian markets and some controlled
evaluations of experimental targeting strategies before we can draw firm
conclusions on the appropriateness of this method. It does seem likely to me
that the disrepute into which street-level enforcement has fallen may turn out
in the case of heroin to be more cost-effective than other strategies. It seems,
however, that such a strategy would have little effect on cocaine or marijuana
markets, since only a relatively small share of these drugs is sold on the street29
and the retail price of the drugs is not very sensitive to changes in low-level
dealer costs”.
In evaluating all such strategies we need also to encourage policy makers
to be more explicit about what goals they expect their strategies to achieve. This
will, I believe, expose the general and unattainable goals which are implicit in
a generalized strategy statement (such as the presumption that drug enforcement
can stop drug abuse given sufﬁcient resources and powers) for the unrealistic
nostrums which they are. More important, though, they allow the sort of
thinking which leads to more precise tailoring of specific strategies to particular
goals. For example, given the political reality that serious consideration will not
2“ The amount by which drug consumers increase or reduce their consumption in relation
to increases or decreases in the prices they must pay for a certain level of drug purchases.
37 Peter Reuter and Mark Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug
Enforcement. unpublished paper. August 1985.
.“f Mark Kleiman. William Holland and Christopher Hayes, Report to the District Attorney
for Essex County: Evaluation of the Lynn Drug Task Force, (Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. Cambridge. Mass, 1984).
Although it is important that we verify this assumption for Australia. Again we need local
research to test that characteristics of American markets hold here.
3" Reuter and Kleiman. I985.
N c
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be paid to suggestions to wind back drug enforcement, we might decide to aim
some of our strategies more at reducing drug-related crime than at stopping
drugs entering the community“. Thus, we might intensify efforts to arrest,
control and treat frequent heroin users who commit offences, since we know
that a smallish number of heavy users of heroin commit a disproportionately
high number of offences”. We also know that criminal activity of heavy heroin
users decreases (but does not disappear) if they can be induced to reduce or
eliminate their heroin use”. It might make sense, then, to allocate some of our
enforcement resources to identifying and apprehending heavy users of heroin.
The importance of more precise goal setting, mentioned above, is that such a
program, backed up by appropriate treatment facilities, would be seen explicitly
as an incapacitative, crime-reduction measure and not primarily as a
rehabilitative one. No doubt one can argue the merits of the proposal, but it is
this sort of debate over speciﬁc means and ends which is so obviously lacking
from discussions on drug policy in this country.
The question of means and ends brings us back again to the question of
the relationships between drugs and organized crime. The type of analysis I have
suggested we need, that is, one which focuses on obtaining accurate information
on drug market structures and characteristics as the underpinning of speciﬁc
drug enforcement strategies, suggests that far from defeating organized crime,
aggressive, high-level enforcement efforts may, paradoxically, make it a greater
threat (or increase the probability that organized crime does indeed control the
drug trade, depending on one’s point of view). Indeed, as Kleiman points out:
...if the effect of successful drug enforcement is to increase the total
revenues of drug trafﬁckers and to increase the value of the ability to use
violence to transact business and to thwart investigations and prosecutions,
then this strategy will be self-defeating. Both the overall value of the drug
markets and the advantages enjoyed within them by the most dangerous
groups will increase“.
If we accept that harsh enforcement aimed as much at loosening the grip
of organized crime as at reducing drug use in fact may act to increase the wealth
and power of organized crime (however deﬁned), does this mean that we cease
enforcement at the high trafﬁcking levels? Clearly the answer is no. First, it is
politically unacceptable and can be dismissed out of hand on those grounds
alone. Second, targeting high-level trafﬁckers continues to serve an important
3 Mark H. Moore, ‘Controlling Criminogenic Commodities: Drugs, Guns, and Alcohol’, in
J. Q. Wilson (ed.), Crime and Public Policy (Institute for Contemporary Studies. San
Francisco, I983), pp. l25-l44.
Bruce D. Johnson. The Drug-Crime Nexus: Research on the Drug-Crime Relationship with
Emphasis upon Heroin Users/Injectors as Criminal Recidivists (mimeographed paper,
Interdisciplinary Research Center, New York, December 1981); Ian Dobinson and Pat
Ward. Drugs and Crime. A Survey of N.S.W. Prison Property Oﬂenders 1984 (N.S.W.
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney, 1984).
33 George Nash, ”Analysis of Twelve Studies of the Impact of Drug Abuse Treatment on
Criminality”, in Drug Use and Crime: Report of the Panel on Drug Use and Criminal
Behaviour (National Institute on Drug Abuse, Rockvill, Maryland, 1976); David N. Nurco,
John C. Ball, John W. Shaffer and Thomas E. Hanlon, ‘The Criminality of Narcotic
Addicts’, The Journal ofNervous and Mental Disease, 1985, 173(2), pp. 94—102.
3‘ Mark Kleiman, ‘Drug Enforcement and Organized Crime’ in H. E. Alexander and G. E.
Caiden (eds), The Politics and Economics ofOrganized Crime (Lexington Books, Lexington,
1985), pp. 67-87.
x.
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public policy goal of expressing community disgust at the activity and may deter
some marginal contenders for a market share. But accepting the reality of the
policy’s effects could lead us to resist efforts to further increase efforts to target
this level of the drug trade and should lead us to be more circumspect (and,
frankly, honest) about the claims we make for the outcomes of enforcement
options. The analysis suggests that we should design enforcement policies in
ways which seek to minimize the growth of organized and/or violent groups”.
Thus, rather than devoting1ncreasing resources to a simple strategy of aggressive
enforcement against high-level drug dealers we might examine the likely
consequences of targeting the activities that make organized crime a different
problem from conspiracy. This might involve concentrating more of our
resources on murder, witness intimidation, perjury, and enforcement corruption
rather than on drug charges per se. Kleiman argues that:
. . . if we are worried that intensive drug enforcement will create
competitive advantages for those groups best able to obstruct the
enforcement process, we should set out to create competitive disadvantages
for such groups. Insofar as we know who they are in advance, this can be
done by targeting them directly; insofar as they start out unknown to us,
then it must be done by allowing them to target themselves by engaging
in the activities we fear In either case, the targets may not be the most
important drug dealers“.
As noted earlier, the analysis also suggests the controversial conclusion that
we should look again at the value of a street-level and medium-level approach
to drug enforcement, at least in the case of heroin. Such a strategy would need
to be much better planned, co-ordinated, and resourced then previous efforts,
but is is a strategy which needs another look. Once again, though, we need to
state realistic goals—which may be to limit or keep more discrete local markets
rather than to aim at the unattainable goal of elimination.
Police Powers
Police forces in Australia hold ﬁrmly to the view that if only they were
given the powers they would be able to make signiﬁcant inroads into (some say
eliminate) the drug problem. Calls for the extension of telephone tapping powers
are clearly based on this assumption. The question we must askin considering
these calls is what effects one is expecting to achieve. There is no doubt that
telephone taps and other instrusive powers will result in more convictions—
many of individuals considered to be higher up the drug trafﬁcking chain. In
law enforcement eyes this may be measured a considerable success. However,
the real test is how these arrests, and such other successes as seizures of drugs
and forfeitures of assets, affect the drug market. Enforcement agencies only need
increased powers to target high-level trafﬁckers and, as I have shown, there is
a plausible case that such a targeting strategy will have little effect on drug usage
and may have the unintended side-effect of intensifying market competition and
increasing the amount of organization, sophistication, and violence in the top
levels of the drug market. To my mind, these are cogent reasons for being wary
of introducing further powers for drug enforcement agencies. Certainly, we
ought not to be stampeded by the often emotive calls from the agencies
themselves or by comments by visiting dignitaries, such as those made recently
35 ibid, p. 80.
3° ibid, p. 82.
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by F.B.I. Director, Judge William Webster”. Mr Webster’s claims of the
“tremendous success” of phone tapping in the United States need to be assessed
with an- eye to the lack of any credible evidence there that drug enforcement
has made any inroads at all into the level of importation, cultivation,
manufacture or use of the drugs which are accorded the bulk of enforcement
effort (i.e., heroin, cocaine, and marijuana)”. Premier Wran was, I believe, right
to be somewhat sceptical about the F.B.I. Director’s suggestion that widening
telephone tapping powers in Australia would have a signiﬁcant impact on our
drug problems.
Conclusion
My conclusion from the sort of analysis I have presented here is that, on
the whole, not only has law enforcement failed to control illicit drug use, but
that necessarily it fails to do so because of the structure of illegal markets for
these particular commodities. This being so, it is pointless to address “the drug
problem” primarily in terms of increased, more powerful, or even more efﬁcient,
drug enforcement. There are probably some drugs and some markets which can
be attacked by enforcement with some success; but to do so we need much more
information about the behaviour of buyers and sellers in Australian markets
and we need consciously to target speciﬁc drugs and market levels on the basis
of this information. Some of this research should be done by universities and
government research bodies and some could usefully be done by the National
Crime Authority39 and by police departments. Even in the absence of speciﬁc
data (that is, until such time as it can be collected) we could certainly do better
with drug enforcement by specifying targets and strategies more precisely and
by trying to tailor enforcement efforts according to out theoretical understanding
of drug markets. In order to do this we will have to tone down both our rhetoric
and our expectations about this policy option. We certainly need to be more
precise about our understanding of the relationship between drug trafﬁcking and
organized crime and, more basically, about the nature of organized crime itself.
Of greatest importance of all, however, will be the realization that the “answers”
to the~ “drug problem”, if there are any, primarily rest with the demand side of
the equation, not the supply side. Ultimately, we have to ﬁnd strategies which
dissuade users from continuing or potential users from starting inappropriate
drug use. On the whole, these strategies will not be enforcement ones.
’7 “Wran Ridicules F.B.l. Chief‘s Phone Tapping Suggestion‘, Sydney Morning Herald, 1
February I986,
38 Although enforcement has made a signiﬁcant contribution to reducing the availability of
some dangerous drugs, notably methamphetamine and methaqualone. These successes
have. regrettably. gone largely unheralded.
3" In his report on the drug trade, Frank Costigan, Q.C., stresses, rightly. I believe, the
importance of preventing the NCA from becoming bogged down in the investigation of
individual drug syndicates instead of concentrating on developing new strategies to control
the importation of drugs,
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr Grant Wardlaw
Because criticizing current drug enforcement policies is often
misinterpreted let me make a couple of preliminary points quite clear. First, I
view as a very important social goal, that of reducing harmful drug use.
The second is that by warning of what I see as either the deleterious
consequences or some of the drawbacks of current enforcement policies I am
not just out to make an academic attack on law enforcement agencies or
practises. I am not opposed as a matter of principle to increased or novel powers
per se nor to increases in law enforcement capabilities or budgets. What I would
like to see,‘ however, is that any changes that we make in these directions are
reasoned responses based on as good as data as we can get or at least on decent
theoretical arguments and resultant strategies which are as precisley targeted as
possible. Further if the strategies that we currently have or which we implement
do not work by some reasonable evaluative criterion then my argument is that
we should abandon them rather than merely cling to options which we hope
vainly may work if only we try harder. It is my contention that that is what we
do at the moment.
Much of what passes for analysis for organized crime in Australia is, I
believe, expressed in terms basically of metaphors and analogies, often tinged
with moralistic tones. We notably lack, in this country as in many others,
empirical studies—admittedly those being difﬁcult, but I submit by no means
impossible, to carry out. We lack conceptual clarity about what we mean by
the concept of organized crime and above all we lack a clear deﬁnition of what
exactly organized crime constitutes. Mr Costigan has spoken in his opening
remarks about the deﬁnitions. I submit that very often the sort of deﬁnition
that he speaks about is not considered. The result is that whilst most people
would agree that there is a problem of organized crime in Australia and that it
is a problem of increasing seriousness which demands different, better or more
law enforcement devoted to it there is no clear agreement about the precise
nature and extent of the problem or about the appropriate strategies for dealing
with it. In short I would characterize the subject of organized crime as being
one which is surrounded by deﬁnitional confusion, beset by problems of
measurement and characterized very often by emotionalism, irrationality and
fear.
If organized crime can be so categorized then that other major feature of
our contemporary demonology, drug abuse, is even more so characterized in
this manner.
It is difﬁcult to think of an issue which is more surrounded by strong
emotions and which inhibits to such a degree proper consideration of all of the
policy options which are possible in a drug control strategy and this is
particularly true when the issue revolves around that of drug trafﬁcking. As with
organized crime, drug trafﬁcking suffers from confusion over the basic concepts
and deﬁnitions and over the immense difﬁculties of obtaining accurate
information. In Australia we lack even the most rudimentary data base,
particularly covering a decent period of time, which would allow the production
of estimates of incidence and prevalence of use of particular drugs of concern.
Such estimates that have been made in various Royal Commission Reports and
other papers, in my view, are so clearly methodologically ﬂawed as to allow no
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conﬁdence to be placed in them and certainly all of the estimates in Royal
Commissnon Reports differ so much from one another that it is hard on any
rational basis to decide if any of them are correct, which one would be.
In spite of having no clear picture of the dimensions of illegal drug use
and in spite of our woeful lack of knowledge about the various markets for
illegal drugs in Australia it seems that we as a society are convinced that the
situation is extremely serious, may even be out of control, and that enforcement
of the drug laws to a harsher degree should be the primary mechanism for
reducing illicit drug use. A number of contributors to the public debate,
particularly politicians and some law enforcement personnel, believe or speak
as if they believe that drug enforcement can virtually eliminate illegal drug use
if only sufﬁcient resources are devoted to it or proper powers are given to
enforcement agencies.’
The view that enforcement is central to a drug control strategy is reinforced
in my view by the common belief that organized crime plays a major part, if
not the major part, in drug traﬂicking. This is in spite of the fact that the most
widely held motion of organized crime as a centrally-organized, hierarchically-
structured, power-grabbing entity with reasonably stable structures is clearly not
descriptive of large sections of the Australian drug market. There is plenty of
evidence, certainly at the anecdotal level, from case studies and court reports
of the presence of a considerable number of individual entrepeneurs and many,
maybe most, of the so called organizations involved in the importation and
distribution of drugs do not conform to the basic characteristics said to
distinguish organized from ordinary crime. There are in fact many organizations
involved in the drug trade in Australia. They are often ﬂoating groups which
form and reform and many have a tendency to decentralization.
One possible way of characterizing the drug industry, or a large part of it,
is to say that it is fragmented, basically uncoordinated, consists of different and
changing numbers of levels for different markets and involves constant changes
of personnel albeit that there are some notable exceptions. These characteristics
are not those which most reports say are supposed to deﬁne organized crime.
The question then arises, why is the belief so strong that organized crime is so
very central to drug trafﬁcking in Australia?
In my paper I advance three possible reasons for the strength of this belief.
The ﬁrst is simply that it may be true. For the reasons outlined in the paper, I
believe, however, that although we cannot dismiss the notion, neither can we
accept it uncritically as we are often asked to do. In spite of the plethora of
reports and the firm convictions of many eminent contributors to the debate
the problem of definition, measurement and lack of objectivity all conspire to
render a verdict, in my opinion, of not proven so far.
The second reason for the strength of the importance of organized crime
to drug trafﬁcking, certainly in the public mind, is the treatment given by the
media to the topics of both drugs and organized crime. Often their coverage is
sensational in nature, blurs important distinctions, has the tone of moral outrage
about it and is heavily inﬂuenced by American stereotypes which portray
organized crime as a mafia type conspiracy centred on ethnic grouping. This
latter view has been subjected to vigorous criticism even in the United States.
I believe we should exercize much greater caution in borrowing models of
organized crime from other countries without checking whether comparable
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social, political, economic, and cultural factors would make them appropriate
in our local context.
And ﬁnally, we return again to the failure to deﬁne organized crime. In
the absence of a decent deﬁnition, or a deﬁnition which is constant across a
number of jurisdictions and agencies, we may often simply confuse what I
would call criminal organization and sophistication with the concept of
ogranized crime. As society becomes more complex and as technology has
opened the way to new crimes or new ways of committing old ones, the nature
of crime is changing and almost by deﬁnition it seems to me eventually all crime
is going to be organized crime. Surely that is not what we mean by a conceopt
of organized crime, a concept which is being used to justify the creation of new
investigations agencies or the introduction of new powers.
It seems to me that many of the cases, particularly in the drug trafﬁcking
ﬁeld which are used as evidence of organized crime are in fact more evidence
of the sort of basic organization and sophistication which I have just mentioned.
To be sure they constitute serious law enforcement problems but I submit they
are not the same as those which carry the sinister implications of something
called organized crime.
In spite of those sorts of difﬁculties, many people speak as if it is entirely
clear what the dimensions of the drug problem are and what the involvement
of organized crime is in it. The scenario that is painted is often very simple.
Drug abuse is said to tear away the basic fabric and values of society. The
situation has reached a crisis point because of the increasing involvement of
organized crime. The way to stamp out both drug trafﬁcking and organized
crime is to concentrate more resources in the law enforcement sector and to
introduce novel or extended powers and harsher sentences. To be sure we are
also creating new agencies, putting new money into education and treatment
resources but one can’t help feeling that most faith is being placed in drug law
enforcement initiatives. By linking drugs to organized crime policy makers can
justify to the public almost any powers or increase in enforcement activity.
In order to evaluate the likely effects of current moves to increase
enforcement powers and resources I believe we have to go beyond the
often
grandiose claims or hopes of some enforcement agencies and look at a diverse
range of data. Speciﬁcally there is no point in relying on enforcement statistics
on their own to judge the success or failure of enforcement initiatives. Larger
numbers of drug arrests, higher quality of arrests (that is more arres
ts higher
up the trafﬁcking chain), large seizures of drugs, forfeiture of assets and
longer
sentences for drug offenders, all amount to very little if we can demonstrate no
convincing decline in illegal drug use following them.
If we are to have a soundly based and rational drug enforcement policy
we need to turn more to evaluations based on knowledge of the structure and
markets for illegal drugs. At present the best model that I can ﬁnd is the sort
of evaluation which a recent Rand Corporation study did on drug enforceme
nt
strategies. That study analysed the effects of drug enforcement on drug ma
rkets
of improvements in a number of levels of drug enforcement strategies starting
at source control measures in countries where illegal drugs are produced to
intensifying efforts to interdict at the customs border, succeeding in
incarcerating principals at high levels of drug trafﬁcking chains or, at the other
end, intensifying the enforcement of laws against low level retailers. The
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research, which was 'very detailed, concluded that greatly increasing the
resources devoted to any of the alternatives would be unlikely to have a
signiﬁcant impact on illicit drug use.
With this overall conclusion in mind let me turn now to the one option
which currently stands out as attracting most support in terms of political and
public backing: Drug enforcement agency resources allocation and proposals for
greater powers to allow it to be carried out or pursued more vigorously and
more effectively—that option obviously is targeting high-level drug trafﬁckers.
It is a policy which at ﬁrst glance has much to commend it. High-level
traffickers are seen as more morally blameworthy than others and there is thus
a great deal of satisfaction engendered by their capture. But it also seems an
eminently sensible policy. After all we might expect on the face of it that arrest
of such individuals would have a larger impact on the drug market than arrest
of small time distributors or users. The question we have to ask is whether in
fact that is what happens.
In the paper I set out two sets of propositions which I believe we have to
have data on before we can evaluate the possible effectiveness of targeting high-
level traffickers.
One set of propositions, if it were true, would probably mean that at least
at a theoretical level we would accept that high-level trafﬁcking targeting
strategies would be very effective. If the other set of propositions is true, then
I believe (there is signiﬁcant anecdotal evidence at least for that set) we would
expect that targeting high-level dealers would not have the severity of
consequences that we presume. In order to choose between the two sets of
assumptions set out in the paper we need the sort of data about the nature of
drug markets and their composition and operation in Australia which simply
at this point in time we lack.
I also suggest that we need to be much more sophisticated in analysing the
effect of structures for different sorts of drugs and different sorts of markets on
targeting strategies and that, in fact, for some drugs there is a good argument
for returning to some sort of street-level enforcement policy (the arguments for
which, are contained in the paper) if we look at the drug enforcement activity
as a crime reduction goal rather than in terms of trying to stop drug abuse in
the community.
My conclusions is that not only do I think that law enforcement has failed
to control illegal drug use but, because of the structure of the drug markets and
features of drug trafficking, that it necessarily fails to do so. Increasing resources
and increasing powers well may succeed in locking up more and more people
involved in the drug trade but in the ﬁnal analysis that will not have the desired
effect in terms of numbers of people using illicit drugs. We certainly need to be
more precise about our understanding of the relationship between drug
trafﬁcking and organized crime, but basically more precise about the nature of
organized crime itself. Of greatest importance of all however, will be the
realization that the answers, if there are any, to the drug problem will in the
ﬁnal analysis rest with the demand side of the equation and not with the supply
side. Ultimately we have to ﬁnd strategies which dissuade users with continuing
or from starting inappropriate drug use. On the whole I believe that these
strategies will not be enforcement ones.
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THE CONFISCATION OF CRIMINAL PROFITS
Matthew Goode, LLB. (Hons), LLM.
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Adelaide
“. . . the value of the punishment must not be less in any case
than what is efﬁcient to outweigh that of the proﬁts of the offence.”
(Bentham, 0n Morals and Legislation, Volume 11, Chapter XIV, at
16). ‘
Introduction
On April 2, 1985, the Special Premiers’ Conference on Drugs—otherwise
known as the Drug Summit—agreed in' general terms that legislation should be
introduced to enable the forfeiture and conﬁscation of the assets of convicted
drug dealers. This could not be regarded as unexpected. Calls for action on the
front had come from the Williams and Stewart Royal Commissions, Special
Prosecutor Redlich, and the Expert Group of the UN. Division of Narcotic
Drugs. The issue had been on the agendas of the Standing Committee of
Attorneys-General and the Australian Police Ministers Council for some time.
, The Drug Summit was, both in retrospect and at the same time, typical of
the highly politicized, emotional and ignorant Australian approach to the “drug
problem” so-called—for example, unlike. the economic summit, it did not
include those non-politicians who could have made an effective and
knowledgeable contribution, the agenda was artiﬁcially limited, and the results
were dictated in advance‘. The agreement with respect to forfeiture and
conﬁscation is as good an example as any. Such legislation already exists in the
Commonwealth Customs Act, and variations exist already in the legislation of
most, if not by now, all Statesz. The utility of agreeing that legislation should
be introduced is highly doubtful, given that the legislation in place is recent,
and that the States cannot agree on its form. '
The appeal of the notion is undoubted. It is the appeal of the slogan “crime
should not pay”. Politicians ofall colours have acutely observed that the vision
of stripping “Mr Big” of his ill-gotten gains is appealing to the electorate3. The
 
' The Premier, Mr. Cain, has accused the Federal Government of ‘pre-empting’ the outcome
of today’s National Drug Summit.
Mr. Cain said the Hawke GOVernment had already produced a document as the
campaign strategy emerging from today‘s meeting.
‘I have come here today to put Victoria’s case on what should be done to ﬁght the drug
problem in a co—ordinated approach, only to ﬁnd that as far as the Commonwealth is
concerned its mind is made up.
I will not be party to a predetermined strategy and will be putting Victoria‘s position
most vigorously.’ The Herald, 2—4—85.
See the Commonwealth Customs Act, 55. 228, 228A, 229, 229A and Division
3 of Part
X1], (55. 243A-2435); the New South Wales Poisons Act, 55. 45Ac, 45AD; the V
ictorian
Drugs. Poisons and Cantral/ed Substances Act, ss. 81—90, I lO-l 16; the Queensland Health
Act, s.|30L; the South Australian Controlled Substances Act, 55. 46—49; the Tasmanian
Poisons Act, 55‘ 84. 86A-86D; the Western Australian Misuse afDrugs Act, ss. 16—
l9.
3 Thus. for example, under the headline “N.S.W. plans to seize assets of drug world’s ‘Mr
Bigs’”:
The ‘Mr Bigs’ of the drug industry would face life imprisonment and conﬁscation of
assets under new legislation in New South Wales, Premier Neville Wran told Parlia
ment
yesterday.
He said the new legislation was aimed at the criminal entrepeneurs who had so far deﬁed
the efforts of traditional police methods.
Mr. Wran told journalists outside Parliament that the commission infringed civil
liberties in some areas, but it was necessary to ‘ﬁght ﬁre with ﬁre’. The Age, 3—10—85.
I~l
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detail turns out to be a little more complicated than that—at least to those who
have a concern that the expedient passage of ill-considered legislation drafted
as widely as possible will catch, not “Mr Big”, but just further crush those
unfortunates at the bottom of the tree who are caught now anyway, and who
are more than sufﬁciently monstered. How that is not only possible, but
probable, is one of the major themes of this paper“.
Another is that, although the implementation of the great idea of forfeiture
of criminal assets had been around for a number of years now, there is no
evidence that anyone has been doing some detailed thinking (beyond the level
of rhetoric) about precise policy objectives—and precisely what the great idea
is really all about. A major indicator of this fact is that all of the examples, and
all of the rhetoric, surrounding the measure, deal with drugs. There are two
major difficulties with this: the ﬁrst is that there is legislation already in place,
(although that legislation is, to varying degrees, awful), and the second is that
there is every indication that the proposed general legislation will not replace
the awfulness, but will rather leave it in place and thereby compound its. That
is to say, it is highly likely that the proposed uniform legislation dealing with
forfeiture of criminal assets presently before the Standing Committee of
Attorneys-General will not replace the enacted drug forfeiture legislation but
will be in addition to it. .
This is to be greatly regretted. If there are multiple offences, two separate
applications, on different criteria, will be required. Alternatively, the differing
criteria will affect prosecution practices. Further, it is submitted that the drug
legislation is uniformly bad, and should be replaced. But, if that is not to be
done, the proposals should be evaluated, not in the context of highly emotive
examples based on the “drug menace”, but rather in the context of such offences
as conspiracy to defraud the revenue, illegal bookmaking and currency
violations.
Targeting
Lest the rather cynical tone of the preceding paragraphs decieve, let there
be no doubt that, in general, the idea of attacking criminal assets has merit. If
there is to be any rational debate about that great idea—and that is to be greatly
doubted—there can be no doubt at all that those who break the criminal law
should be deprived of any proﬁt they may make in so doing. The great idea,
like much of the obvious, has been around for a long time”: there are even
4 The Hodgson Committee said ofthe American experience:
Until 1980, the powers of criminal forfeiture were used relatively rarely. In this
ﬁrst decade only $1,964,000 was forfeited. Pan of the explanation is the complexity of
R.l.C.O. and C.C.E. offences which were seen by many prosecutors as simply duplicative
of existing offences handled by state prosecutors. The courts had also warned prosecutors
of the dangers of abuse where R.I.C.0. was invoked outside its intended context of
organized crime. (Emphasis added).
Proﬁts of Crime and their Recovery, Report of a Committee chaired by Sir Derek Hodgson,
Cambridge Studies in Criminology, L11, (1984), herafter referred to as Hodgson.
5 As the author understands it, the legislation proposed in New South Wales will replace
the provisions in the Poisons Act.
6 In early English law, there was forfeiture on attainder for felons and traitors, statutory
forfeiture, and deodand. See, generally, Finkelstein, “The Goring Ox: Some Historical
Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of
Sovereignty“ (I973) 46 Temp, L. Q. 169, and Hodgson, at 12—19.
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Biblical sources7, and most, if not. all, legal systems which have roots in English
common law, retain great legal advances such as the forfeiture of hosebreaking
implements and the like“.
What is now bruited about, however, goes much further than the chopping
down of a tree which has dropped a branch on some unfortunate, or the
conﬁscation of burglars’ tools. It is no more and no less than nationally co-
ordinated legislation which will attack organized crime by the conﬁscation of
assets and proﬁts obtained by criminal activity (except, for some unfathomable
reason, by drug trafﬁcking, whatever that may mean)9. The great enthusiasm
about attacking “Mr Big” has, however, led to a blindness in formulating the
detailed proposals in precise ways to achieve that laudable end. In short, there
has been, to date, a failure to conform legislation to the policy targetting: who
the legislation is after, and how it will work. As the various drug forfeiture
statutes show, the implementation of the great idea seems to consist of drawing
the legislative net as widely as possible to ensure that no one can escape, and
trusting in the discretion of prosecution and court to deal appropriately with
the minnows who become entangled in the mesh“).
It is submitted that this approach is indefensible. If there are to be
draconian laws aimed at organized crime, and these laws are to involve severe
intrusions into civil liberties in the interests of justice based on precise policy,
- then the legislation must be carefully drawn to achieve those policy ends—and
no more. The legislation should match the justiﬁcations offered for it, and
should, in addition, conform to the defensible notions of justice and desert.
The Legislative Framework
The basic framework of the typical legislative scheme consists of the
following measures: a power of forfeiture, a power to impose a pecuniary
penalty, a power to freeze assets pending proceedings, a power to search and
seize, and provisions empowering sequestration of assets and the appointment
of an ofﬁcial trustee. These matters will be discussed in more detail below. there
is, however, one preliminary matter which must be discussed. That is the general
issue of the “trigger” for the legislation. What is to be the general criterion for
the application of one or more of these measures?
7 “if an ox gore a man or a woman that they die: then the ox shall surely be stoned, and _
his ﬂesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit.” Exodus 21:28.
5 sec Hodgson at 17.
While the emotive phrase “drug trafﬁcker” is often bandied about, the deﬁnition at law
of that term, or its local equivalent, varies widely. It is also clear that the legislation of
all States grossly overdeﬁnes the term in terms of its political or rhetorical range. For
example, it is clear that, under the Queensland Health Act, any person who attempts to
give a cannabis cigarette to another is guilty as a “trafficker”. This result is achieved by
an overblown deﬁnition of the word “sell".
'0 see Note, “A Proposal to Reform Criminal Forfeiture under R.I.C.O. and C.C.E." U984)
97 H.L.R. [929 at l938:
“The current approach thus grants prosecutors virtually unchecked discretion to seek
and inﬂict severe forfeiture penalties for a wide range of criminal conduct. The mere threat
of forfeiture of one’s entire business could prompt an innocent defendant to plea bargain
with the government. A defendant who is convicted may suffer penalties far greater than
those usually applied to his offence." .
c
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The ﬁrst question is whether or not the legislation should require the
precondition of conviction of a criminal offence. Put another way, the question
is whether the legislation should be confined to what might be called “criminal
forfeiture” or whether it should extend to “civil forfeiture” as well. the
American legislation extends to civil forfeiture, and one commentator has
described the difference between the two types of forfeiture as follows:
A civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, and the property is the
defendant. The focus of the action is on the use of the property, not the
motive of the individual. No conviction of the person who used the
property illegally is required because the personal guilt of the individual
is not at issue. The standard of proof is the civil standard of probable
cause. . . . criminal forfeiture is an in personam procedure requiring a
conviction of the person who used the property illegally . . . the criminal
action focuses on‘ the motive of the individual, not on the use of the
property . . . the Government must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the property was connected to criminal activity . . . 1'
There are essentially three differences between the two models. First, the
criminal model requires an antecedent conviction, the civil does not. Second,
the criminal model requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, the civil model
requires only proof on the balance of the probabilities. Third, the civil model
relates the forfeiture to the time at which the illicit dealing took place, thus
rendering any subsequent dealing with the property void, whereas criminal
forfeiture relates back to the moment of conviction”.
It is submitted that the legislation should be confined to the criminal
model. The civil model was used exclusively in the United States until 1970
because of a policy aversion to criminal forfeiture relating to its abuse by the
British during the Revolution and because of the possibility of a constitutional
bar to criminal forfeiture”. Moreover, the holder of “tainted property” in the
United States has the beneﬁt of at least some constitutional protections (such
as due process) which are not available in Australia".
Moreover, it is submitted that civil forfeiture offends the spirit of double
jeopardy. The Crown will be given, in effect, a second chance at an accused,
with even more advantages the second time. It is mere ﬁction that the procedure
is really “civil”. Calling a cat a dog does not make it so. This is clear from
Vickers v. Minister for Business and Consumer Aﬂairs”. The case concerned the
forfeiture provisions of the Customs Act, which are civil in the sense that the
burden of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Mr Vickers was charged with
importing narcotics into Australia. At the time of his arrest, $8,000 was seized
from his person. Later, $15,000 was seized from his bank accounts. He was
" Diepenbrock, “California Forfeiture Statute: A Means for Curbing Drug-Trafficking.”
(1984) 15 Pac. L.J. 1035 at 1035-1037.
'2 see Pianin, “Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized
Narcotics Trafficking" (1982) 32 Am. U.L.R. 227 at 233-235.
'3 Article III, Para. 3, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution states “[No] Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted.” The ﬁrst Congress prohibited forfeiture in federal criminal proceedings. 1 Stat
l 17, (I790). Some courts have held that the constitutional prohibition may ban forfeiture
of estate for all crimes—an example is US. v. Grande(l980) 620F. 2d 1026 at 1038 (4th.
Cir.), (dictum). Hodgson sets out a brief history of the matter at 30—32.
'4 It is not at all clear which constitutional protections apply. see Hodgson at 31.
'5 (1982) 43 A.L.R. 389.
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acquitted. he applied to get his money back. The $15,000 was returned because
it did not .fall within the terms of the Act. But the $8,000 was not returned
despite the acquittal. Morling J. held that he would not have found beyond
reasonable doubt that Mr Vickers was involved in the importation of drugs,
but he could so ﬁnd on the balance of probabilities“.
This is utterly offensive. Mr Vickers was tried twice for the same offence.
he was acquitted the ﬁrst time, but was ﬁned $8,000 the second time, and it
was only a technicality which saved the extra $15,000”. No doubt that hole
will be ﬁlled quickly. But the major point remains, and it cannot be cured by
the ﬁction that the second proceedings are really civil in nature. It is therefore
submitted that the conﬁscation measure must require at least conviction or
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The question then becomes: will any conviction do? should something
more be required? After all, the aim is at Mr Big. The answer to the question
turns in part upon matters yet to be discussed, but if, for the sake of argument,
there are to be very wide sweeping powers attached to the measure, then one
may wish to be very careful about the deﬁnition of the offence which will
“trigger” the powers.
One method would be to list the offences to which the measure appliesin
the Act itself. This may be considered impractical, but has the advantage of
precision. The Hodgson Committee settled upon a minimum- amount of money
involved”. This has at least the advantage of ensuring that the measure will be
. used against the large offenders and not just as another stick to beat the petty
criminal. -
Mr Costigan made reference to this problem in his Final Report. He
quoted the proposal of the Australian Police Ministers Council that the
conﬁscation legislation should apply to (a) theft, fraud, tax evasion, currency
violation, drug dealings, illegal gambling, arson, obtaining ﬁnancial advantage
by vice engaged in by others, extortion, violence or bribery, or corruption or
an activity that involves matters of the same general nature as one or more of
the foregoing; and (b) more than one person and substantial planning and
organization. He then said:
The suggestion that these provisions apply only to ‘relevant activities’
of the type described is likely to abort the effectiveness of these provisions.
The ill that is being cured is the failure of the present law to deal with the
proﬁts of crime, thus permitting the criminal to retain the proﬁt no matter
what his punishment. The argument that he should lose his proﬁt has equal
force no matter what the crime, irrespective of whether he did it alone or
in company, or employed substantial planning or organization. The
introduction of conditions of that type simply allows much legal debate as
to whether they are satisﬁed, and allows this for no good reason”.
'6 id.. at 395—396.
'7 The reason was that money standing to the credit ofa savings bank account is not “goods“.
not “moveable personal property“. not “monies in the form of cash” and hence does not
fall within the conﬁscation provisions of the Customs Act.
'“ see Hodgson at 74.
'9 Final Report oft/to Royal Commission on the Activities of the Federated Ship Painters and
Dockers Union. Volume 3. Chapter 4. para. 4 077.
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Thus Costigan is arguing that conviction for any criminal offence should
operate as the “trigger”. It is as well to notice, however, that the basis of his
reasoning depends entirely on the conﬁscation of criminal proﬁts. It does not
apply to the forfeiture of assets used in the commission of criminal offences. It
follows that different “triggers” may apply in each case. But, speaking only in
the context of proﬁts, it should be remarked that it is one thing to sell a measure
on the basis that it is an attack on Mr Big. It is quite another to sell it on the
basis that it will apply to all crime, for it is simple to predict what will happen.
It is happening in the context of the speciﬁc drug conﬁscation provisions. The
new measure will not be used to deal with Mr Big. It will be used as another
stick to beat the minor offenders already caught: typically, in the case of drugs,
the low-level cannabis seller”. There is no evidence at all that these criminals
warrant such drastic measures. What can and should be attacked is large-scale
economic crime—not merely the welfare cheats, but also those who proﬁt by
demolishing a protected building, or clearing protected native vegetation, or
discharging wastes into waterways“. These crimes have yet to ﬁgure in the
debate.
It may also be remarked that the dismissal of legislative limitations on the
scope of drastic provisions which are designed to limit them to the policy which
justiﬁes them as, in effect, mere lawyer fodder, is far too simplistic. While such
requirements are often feared by prosecutors, it has been pointed out in the
American context that (a) detailed evidence, graphically presented, assists the
prosecution case; and (b) detailed ﬁnancial evidence is valuable in its own right
in the context of other investigations”.
Although his words are far from clear, it seems that Mr Costigan would
also favour c1vil conﬁscation of proﬁts on the American model. Thus:
It is one thing for it to be triggered by a conviction; another for it to
occur before conviction, as it must do to be eﬂective. The American model
requires proof, in civil proceedings (which means on the balance of
probabilities), of a pattern of racketeering. That is satisﬁed by proof of the
commission of speciﬁed offences within a period of ten years, and evidence
that they are associated with one another to form part of a scheme. . . . I
can see little justiﬁcation for any criminal offence being excluded. The
gravamen should be the repeated commission of oﬂences (no matter what
they are, or in what jurisdiction so long as it is within Australia) for proﬁt.
Thus the “trigger” ought to be expressed in those terms; and limitations
based on the peculiarity of the offence, the number involved, or the degree
of planning and organization should be ignored“.
2" For example, the 1982 Annual Report of Victoria police reveals that of 7 296 detected
drug offences in 1982. 5 031 involved cannabis. Only 603 of those were trafﬁcking offences.
Thus. about 60 per cent of offences known to police were cannabis use offences, and 85
per cent of offences known to police are use offences. There is no reason to believe that
police targetting will move to the other end of the spectrum. Mr Justice Williams
remarked: “There has been too much preoccupation in the past with having users and
minor pedlars convicted.” (Final Report, D12).
3' Cf Hodgson at 9.
2 Pianin. supra note 12 at 236-238.
3 supra note 19, para. 4 078. Hodgson reached a very different conclusion: “We ﬁnd this
concept of quasi-criminal forfeiture troubling. It can too easily be used as a way of
penalizing criminal conduct without the safeguards of the ordinary criminal process". (at
97).
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It is unclear whether Mr Costigan would require the proof of the
commission of the criminal offences beyond reasonable doubt, either as such
at the hearing or by proof of earlier criminal conviction, but, in any event, it
has been submitted above that proof of the commission of criminal “offences”
at the civil standard is unacceptable. That matter aside, the limitation to the
commission of repeated offences of any kind for proﬁt is of interest. Of course,
further discussion would be required as to the meaning of “repeated”, whether
the offences should be linked in any way, and whether Mr Costigan is really
interested in subjecting a shoplifter with a characteristic modus operandi to this
kind of procedure.
In 1973, Mr Douglas Meagher Q.C. spoke approvingly of the “pattern of
racketeering” trigger in a paper delivered to the ANZAAS Conference, and
quoted the deﬁnition adopted in Florida, which states;
“Pattern of racketeering activity” means engaging in at least two
incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents,
results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents
provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of
the Act and that the last of such incidents occurred within ﬁve years after
a prior incident of racketeering conduct“.
Whatever the merits of these “triggers”, the principal point is that the
Americans have taken the trouble to think about exactly who the procedure
should attack“. In particular, a simple restriction to, say, indictable offences is
not appropriate. The distinction between indictable offences and other offences
bears no relation to the policy of pursuing organized crime or crime which
produces high proﬁt (for example, gambling offences, prostitution offences or
conservation offences are commonly not indictable), the distinction is often a
product of nothing more than historical accident, and may be blurred by other
procedural devices such as power by the prosecution or defence to elect
summary trial, or the creation of “minor indictable offences”.
In the low visibility debate in Australia, this issue is being either ignored
or being put into the too hard basket. As a result, Australia will probably acquire
these measures aimed at any indictable offence or any offence at all. This would
be the most wasteful and dishonest course. And again, if the experience with
the drug legislation is any guide, it will mean that there will be no incentive to
apply it to Mr Big: its “success” will be demonstrated by repeated application
against the small ﬁsh. The proponents of these measures should be challenged.
Limit it to the Mr Bigs, and let us see you go after them.
Forfeiture
The basic idea of a forfeiture measure is the conﬁscating of an identiﬁable
asset. The crucial preliminary question is; what asset? There are three categories
which have been suggested. The ﬁrst is simply money or other property
immediately connected with the commission of the offence“. Assuming other
appropriate restrictions. there is nothing wrong with this, although it may seem
1‘ Meagher, “Organized Crime“, paper delivered to the 1983 ANZAAS Conference, Perth.
25 sec. for example. the description of C.C.E. given in Pianin, supra note 12 at 235-236.
2" An example is s. 229A of the Commonwealth Customs Act.
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to ‘be too restrictive for some. Essentially, however, if X is convicted of
attempted bribery of a police ofﬁcer, on the basis that he was apprehended
offering police ofﬁcer Y $1,000, then there can be no objection to the forfeiture
of the $1,000. As a practical matter, this model is useful only where an offender
is apprehended in the course of, or shortly after, the commission of the offence.
The difﬁculty with this option is the restrictions—it is essentially a compromise
between the other two formulae, and, as such, merely defers the policy
question".
The second option, which may be cumulative with the third, is the
forfeiture of the proﬁts of criminal activity. Again, assuming appropriate
restrictions, it seems at ﬁrst glance that there is not much to object to in this.
If X has obtained a proﬁt of $1,000 as a consequence of embezzlement for
which he has been convicted, then the $1,000 should be taken from him. This
seems unexceptionable, but there must be reservations. Here is one. Others will
appear below. First, consider the dimension of time. It is one thing if X is
caught in the act, and the inevitable inference can be drawn from the possession
of an unusual amount of money which relates to the criminal offence for which
there is a conviction. It is quite another if X committed the offence ﬁve years
ago, and what is in issue is the proﬁts of proﬁts. Suppose X makes $1,000 from
a business fraud. He invests the money in a business and ﬁve years later the
interest in that business is worth $20,000. The proﬁts of the business, over the
last ﬁve years, have been $100,000, and X has lived on that income. If all of
that is forfeited, X owes $121,000. He cannot pay it. The business will be closed
and sold. If the operations of a Public Trustee or the typical ﬁnance company
are any indication, the sale will be at a loss. What social interests are served by
the sale? Should the conﬁscation be so limited as to avoid the notion of proﬁts
of proﬁts?
The third approach, which has featured in the current drug legislation, is
the forfeiture of property used in the commission of an offence”. When this is
limited to items, the possession of which is illicit, such as housebreaking
implements, drugs, forged plates and so on, this approach is unexceptionable.
It is the wider application of the idea which is objectionable. Typically, the
proposal is that all property used in the commission of an offence is subject to
forfeiture. This should be strongly resisted. Reasons are not hard to find.
Two have been produced by a recent American commentary. Thus;
If a person convicted . . . conducted or acquired an enterprise entirely
through illegal means, enterprise forfeiture would not impose any penalty
on him beyond that exacted through the forfeiture of proﬁts. Yet if an
individual worked all his life to build up a legitimate business and then
was involved in a single incident of business fraud . . . enterprise forfeiture
would authorize the seizure of his entire life’s eamings”.
27 This may, of course. exist alongside the other two options. Indeed, it may be necessary
in any event. Suppose X is arrested for the importation of drugs. He has $8 000 on his
person. The inference is that the money was to be used to pay bribes. That money does
not represent a proﬁt. Indeed, the only proﬁt at this point in the importation offence is
the imported status of the drug. This raises interesting questions. Assuming that the drug
in Australia can now be revalued upwards. does the Customs Ac! apply to that notional
proﬁt? Should it?
3“ An example is to be found in s. 47 of the South Australian Controlled Substances Act.
This model is common in the drug area.
2" Note. supra note 10 at 1935.
 43
. . . enterprise forfeiture . . . inevitably leads to unequal punishment
of similar crimes . . . a violator who committed his . . . felonies in
connection withta legitimate business will be punished more severely than
one who conducted the same felonious activities from his home”.
These are criticisms which attack (a) the lack of proportionality between
the crime committed and the penalty provided and (b) the arbitrariness of the
measure in terms of the punishment visited upon otherwise equivalent
offenders. Both principles are strongly rooted in Australia ideas of justice. But
the forfeiture of assets used to commit crimes can be attacked on ever stronger
grounds. Such a measure is on the face of it indiscriminatelty stupid.
Two examples will prove the point. Consider the much vaunted American
legislation. In Calero-Torpedo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing C0.,31 Pearsons leased
one of its yachts to a party who was arrested on board in possession of one
cannabis cigarette. The lease speciﬁcally prohibited the lessee from using the
yacht for any unlawful purpose, and there was not the slightest reason to believe
that Pearsons knew that the offence had been committed or even could be
committed. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the test was
whether or not Pearsons had “done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property” and that the provision in the lease
was insufﬁcient to satisfy this test. The yacht was forfeited. Is this really what
is needed? ls possession of one marijuana cigarette qualiﬁcation for MrlBig?
The second example is McGovern v. State of Victoria”. X Was convicted
of a ﬁshing offence on 29 October, 1979. He was ﬁned $1,000, and an order ‘
was made for the forfeiture of the equipment on his boat. The boat was returned
to X but in November 1979, the Attomey-General appealed against the penalty
on the ground of inadequacy. In August 1980, the appeal was allowed and it
was ordered that the boat itself be forfeited to the Crown. At that hearing, X
admitted having sold the boat to another. The boat ended up in the possession
and “ownership” of Y. He bought it for value and in good faith. In September
1981, the boat was seized pursuant to the conﬁscation order. Y wanted an order
to the effect that he nowowned the boat.
Y lost. The crucial passages of what is submitted to be an outrageous result
are as follows:
It is plain in our opinion, that upon forfeiture and without more, the
title to the boat vests in the Crown and that no furtherproceedings are
necessary to make title. . . [It is clear] that a, forfeiture may so operate
regardless of the resultant seizure’s being at the expense of an innocent
purchase”.
3 5 id., at 1935—1936.
(1974) 416 US. 663. The decision, though notorious, is not an isolated example by any
means. See also US. v. One 1975 Mercedes 2805 (1978) 590F. 2d 196, (6th. Cir.) [said
Mercedes forfeit on the basis of four marijuana cigarette butts] and US. v. One Clipper
Bow Ketch Nisku (1977) 548F. 2d 8, (lst. Cir.) [said ketch forfeit on the basis of one and
a half marijuana cigarettes] An Australian example is Mackie (1982) 18 N.T.R. 42.
32 [1984] V.R. 570.
33 id.. at 575.
3
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Worse, the forfeiture order, which occurred before the purchaser had any
interest in the property, let alone an opportunity to debate it in the courts at
great expense, created an order against the world, so that the order was beyond
challenge“. This is the sort of justice that is, apparently, contemplated. These
kinds of forfeiture orders, operating against property used in the commission
of an offence without more, cannot be defended rationally. The fact that they
already exist is of no consequence at all”.
More generally it is submitted that the unattributed author of “A Proposal
To Reform Criminal Forfeiture Under R.I.C.O. and C.C.E.” makes an
overwhelming case to the effect that forfeiture provisions are unnecessary and
unjust“. What may be called a “proﬁts’ ﬁne” or a “pecuniary penalty order”
will do the job better if it is backed by such measures as freezing orders which
will ensure that the assets of the offender remain available to satisfy the
pecuniary penalty. If X has made a proﬁt of $10,000, and has bought a car with
it, what does the Crown care whether it gets the car itself, so long as it gets the
$10,000. What sense does it make to insist on the car?
It is not proposed to rehearse the arguments advanced in the article,
although two have been quoted above. Sufﬁce it to say that the author also
provides convincing arguments that the use of pecuniary penalties substantially
reduces difﬁculties37 and injustices that may otherwise arise in the context of
freezing orders and the protection of the rights of innocent third parties. In any
event, as Hodgson points out, the more one examines the nature of forfeiture,
Ehe 3rlnore it becomes apparent that the forfeiture order is merely security for a
ne .
3‘ id., at 576.
35 see also Parcels, “An Analysis of Federal Drug-Related Civil Forfeiture” (1982) 34 Maine
L.R. 435 at 456:
“If the purpose of forfeiture is punishment, the federal in rem statutes are overly
broad. lnnocent parties, such as rental and leasing companies, banks, and others holding
property interests without possession, may be penalized equally with the guilty. This is
due in part to the theory . . . that forfeiture of innocent parties’ property should produce
a ‘secondary defense’ against crime. This analysis assumes that because of the threat of
forfeiture, such parties will be careful concerning those to whom they rent, lease, or entrust
property and, thus, will restrict criminal activity. With regard to deterrence, the forfeiture
statutes have been too widely utilized. The casual marijuana user who has a marijuana
cigarette in the car ashtray or a small-time drug dealer who uses his automobile only for
personal transportation may face the same penalty as the person who loads twenty tons
of marijuana on his yacht for shipment from Colombia to Maine.“
‘6 supra note 10.
37 Thus, for example, id.. at I941:
“11 is clearly counterproductive to impose a tracing obligation that has the effect of
rewarding those criminals sophisticated enough to launder their proﬁts so expertly that
the prosecutor is forced to give up the chase. lf, however, criminal forfeiture is reconceived
as a proﬁts’ ﬁne, the tracing obligation becomes both conceptually and practically
unnecessary. The only issue would be the extent of the gain derived from the criminal
activity as proved at the post-trial hearing.”
’3 Hodgson at 99. Hodgson makes the further points that in that case,
(a) it ought not to be combined with other penalties if the total effect is too harsh.
and
(b) the means of the offender must be considered.
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Pecuniary Penalty Orders
A pecuniary penalty order is simply a ﬁne that is calculated by reference
to the proﬁts made from criminal behaviour. The point is well made by an
American commentator: .
A sanction that divests criminals of illegally obtained proﬁts effectively
targets the primary source of organized crime’s economic power and deters
individuals who might be willing to endure imprisonment for the sake of
becoming wealthy through crime. In addition, the proﬁts’ ﬁne rests on the
principle of restitution: compelling a convicted Criminal to disgorge the
“gains” from his crime is akin to the traditional private law rule that no
person should proﬁt from his wrong. Because the individual victim cannot
be located, the property unjustly taken is returned to society at large.- A
proﬁts’ ﬁne, therefore, can be clearly understood and justiﬁed as a special
sanction for those who disobey the criminal law for personal gain”.
There are, however, a number of policy issues which remain to be resolved.
(a) Burden of Proofand Reverse Onus Clauses
It is submitted, on the basis of the discussion above, that the commission
of the relevant offence must be proven by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt.
In most cases that will be done by simply putting the conviction into evidence,
either at the sentencing hearing or at some separate proceeding. It should also
be possible for the Crown to proceed without the separate criminal trial, but in
that case the commission of the offence must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The necessity for this alternate procedure rests in the case of the
absconding offender. That case will be discussed below. In most cases, no doubt,
the pecuniary penalty procedure will take place at the sentencing hearing after
a criminal trial.
While it is clear that the proof of guilt must be beyond reasonable doubt,
it may be argued that the Crown should be permitted to prove the proﬁt and
related matters on the balance of probabilities. The reason for this is not the
simplistic assertion that the proceedings are civil in character: that is merely a
question of semantics. Rather, it can be said with justice that the offender has
been proven to have committed the offence, and the presumption of innocence
in such a case is of less force.
It may also be argued that there should be an onus on the offender to
displace the assessment of proﬁt asserted by the Crown. Two matters should
be addressed here:
First, in so far as the Crown proves a proﬁt on the balance of probabilities,
care must be taken that the assessment is a realistic one. In many cases, the
task will be simple. If X has been convicted of embezzlement of $4,000, proof
of the conviction and its circumstances will do the job. However, the task of
ﬁnding the proﬁt in complicated fraud cases, or conspiracy to defraud the
revenue, will be very difﬁcult. The drug legislation provides a warning. It is
common for the media, the police, and politicians to grossly overvalue seized
drugs. This is because the media want to have a big story, the police want to
39 Note. supra note 10 at I934.
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show that they are doing a great job, and the politicians want to make capital
from the seizure. Thus, for example, the seizure of a ﬁeld of immature cannabis
plants is often broadcast as having a “street value” (as if they would all be sold
in some sleazy alley and not in middle-class homes) of some vast sum. There
are two things wrong with this. First, it is commonly an anticipated proﬁt. It is
submitted that the pecuniary penalty provisions (and forfeiture of proﬁts if there
is to be such a thing) should apply to realized and not anticipated proﬁts.
Second, the valuation is usually absurd, not only because it is speculative and
self-serving, but also because the grower or wholesaler never receives street
value. It is common knowledge that, as the drug passes through the chain of
supply, the price increases as the quantity decreases. It has recently been held
that police ofﬁcers cannot give evidence as to the “street value” of drugs
seized“). Rightly so. It is submitted that the assessment of proﬁt should be given
in evidence by the independent sources who do not have a stake in inﬂating
the amount.
Second, the case for a reverse onus clause may be quite strong, but care
must be taken not to take it to extreme lengths. Section 243C of the Customs
Act is an excellent example of an extreme. Essentially, it states that the court is
to presume that any increase in the value of the offender’s property after the
commission of the offence is attributable to that offence. The onus is then on
the offender to prove otherwise. This is absurd. It should be repealed, and it
certainly should not be imitated.
Reasons are not hard to ﬁnd. First, if there is a case for reverse onus, it
should, in accordance with the recommendations of the Senate Standing
Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs“l and the Victorian Committee
on Constitutional and Legal Affairs“, be rebuttable on an evidential standard.
But more importantly, the acid test for such presumptions is whether or not
there is a rational connection between the fact proved (increase in value), and
‘0 Gardner [I980], Qd.R. 531 (CA). Unfonunately, there is a legislative tendency to reverse
this sensible rule. The nastiest is s. 243C (5) of the Commonwealth Customs Act, which
is absolutely indefensible:
“In a proceeding under section 2433, a member of the Australian Federal Police or
an officer of Customs who is experienced in the investigation of narcotics offences may
testifyz”
(a) with respect to the amount that, to the best of his information, knowledge and
belief, was the market value of narcotic goods at a particular time or during a
particular period; or
(b) with respect to the amount, or range of amounts, that, to the best of his
information, knowledge and belief. was the amount, or range of amounts, ordinarily
paid at a particular time or during a particular period for the doing of an act or
thing (not being the selling or other dealing in narcotic goods) comprising a
prescribed narcotics dealing,
notwithstanding any rule or law or practice relating to hearsay evidence, and his
testimony is prima facie evidence of the matters testiﬁed to.“
This is bizarrely objectionable. One of the less obvious reasons is that the
presumption is in fact conclusive. What accused or offender will reveal any knowledge of
the market in light of the obvious advice that to do so would not only be self—serving, but
also fatally revealing?
" Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, The Burden ofProofin
Criminal Proceedings, PP No. 319/1982.
‘2 Victorian Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, The Burden ofProof
in Criminal Proceedings (1985).
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the fact presumed (illicit origin)“. It is obvious that the presumption fails the
test. For example it applies to all property, not property acquired in the interval
between the commission of the offence and the hearing. Thus, if X had land
worth $25,000 at the time of the commission of the offence, and it is now worth
$50,000, the court is to presume that the increase in value came about by illicit
activity. Neither is there a discount for inﬂation. The silliness of this is apparent
on the face of it.
Worse, the effects of inﬂation, for example, will mean that if there is any
gap between the date of the commission of the offence and the hearing, the
presumption will invariably apply. The result will be that all of these offenders
will always be obliged to prove the legitimacy of their assets. If that is what is
intended, it should be clearly stated. It is submitted, however, that that should
not be the law.
Moreover, such a presumption has increasingly irrational effects with the
passage of time, either after the commission of one offence or in the passage of
time between two or more offences. Again, what if the offender has acquired
the proﬁt, not as a consequence of the offence proven, but as the result of the
commission of another criminal offence which may or may not be an offence
subject to this measure, or by shady conduct which may or may not be a
criminal offence? The choices are impossible. If you decide that the offender is
not entitled to the proﬁt if it has been illegally acquired by any offence, then
the ambit of the measure has been expanded to all criminal offences, the reversal
of onus breaches at least the spirit of the privilege against self-incrimination‘“,
and the careful deﬁnition of the “trigger” may as well be discarded. Worse, it
may turn out that the method by which the offender obtained the proﬁt was
not the relevant criminal oﬂence, but may be or may not have been illicit
depending on complex questions of law and fact related to, for example, income
tax evasion. The pecuniary penalty hearing may then turn into a long and
complicated trial for offences which have not been charged or with respect to
which there has been a positive decision not to charge. On the other hand, the
alternative is to allow the offender to keep a proﬁt which is cheerfully admitted
to have been illicitly acquired.
Another dilemma is posed by the question whether the assets to be the
subject of the clause should be assets in the possession of the offender, or assets
owned by the offender. If the clause is conﬁned to ownership, then the canny
offender will avoid its operation by the simple course of alienation of ownership;
but if it applies to possession, at once the difﬁculties arising from the need to
project the interests of innocent third parties arise. No such problems arise in
43 An example ofthe operation ofthe test in US. Bill of Rightsjurisprudence is To! v. US.
(I943) 63 S.Ct. 124]. This test has been adopted by Canadian courts; for example, see
Oakes (1983) 2 C.C.C. (3d) 339 (Ont.C.A.).
‘4 Hodgson at 83—84 states (it is unclear whether this is a minority or majority view):
“Rather, the purpose of the inquiry and the object of placing on the defendant the
duty to explain the origin of his or her assets would be to uncover further suspected
offences. In this, the proposal clashes directly with the presumption of innocence. If
defendants stay silent they may be penalized by having their assets conﬁscated, though
the Crown has not linked their property to the offences of which they were convicted.
and though the Crown has introduced no evidence of their complicity in other offences.
. . . the presumption of innocence should apply to each separate allegation of criminality
and not to be overturned by the defendant’s conviction of other, distinct offences.”
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the simple notion of a pecuniary penalty, for the offender must pay the ﬁne on
the proﬁt, whether he or she now has the proﬁt or not. The reverse onus clause
will simply create more difficulties and technicalities.
The fact of the matter is that the proven facts about the offender’s assets
will speak for themselves without the beneﬁt of a formal reverse onus clause.
If an impecunious farm labourer is convicted of a series of bank robberies, and
it is shown that thereafter he acquired a Rolls Royce, the reality is that the court
will draw its own conclusions, absent explanations. Like most other reverse onus
clauses, this kind is drafted for political capital, or distrust of the common sense
of courts, or both. It is submitted that reference to the total value of assets, and
the reversal of onus, are unnecessary, unjust, and lead to the gross complication
of what ought to be a relatively simple measure“.
(b) The Absconding Oﬂender
It is necessary to make some provision for the offender who has ﬂed the
jurisdiction in order to evade prosecution and/or punishment. It should be
possible for the Crown to acquire an order which will permit it to seize any
asset abandoned by the offender to the amount of the illicit proﬁt.
The procedure in these cases should be fundamentally the same as in other
cases, but special difficulties arise by reason of the fact that the offender is not
present. Although there is no reason why an offender in these circumstances
could not be represented at the hearing, that must be regarded as unlikely.
As in other cases, the Crown should prove the commission of the criminal
offence beyond reasonable doubt, either by proof of conviction or by proof of
the commission of the crime by original evidence, and the proﬁt allegedly
acquired thereby. The fact that the offender is not present raises three major
problems. They will be discussed in turn.
First, where the location of the offender is known, he or she should be
served with a notice setting out the allegations, and what is proposed to be done.
The absent offender must be given a chance to reappear. If that is done, then
there can be no objection to proceeding in the absence of the offender. Where
service of a notice cannot be effected for any reason, the hearing should proceed,
subject to a right in the offender to challenge the result, by a new hearing, if
that is done within, say, six months of the order.
Second, problems will arise where there is a conﬁscation proceeding
predating the trial of the accused. It will be difficult for the accused to avoid
prejudice at his or her trial if a court has already found that he or she has
committed the offence. Moreover, if the conﬁscation court has refused to so
ﬁnd, can the accused argue autrefois, res judicata, or issue estoppel? These
difficulties can be overcome. The problem of prejudice is a real one, but it can
be speciﬁed that the making of a conﬁscation order is inadmissible evidence in
a subsequent trial for that offence. There is still a possibility of inconsistency,
but where there is a conﬁscation order followed by an acquittal, the
inconsistency must lie in the subsequent ability of the accused to conduct a
‘5 Hodgson seems to have come to the same conclusion. A variation is simply to direct the
trial judge to take account of the difference between assets then and now. Section 86 (4),
(a) (v) of the Victorian Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act does just that.
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defence. Moreover, where there is a refusal to make a conﬁscation order
followed by a trail, it is submitted that the pleas should be available.
Third, it is necessary to deﬁne the circumstances in which the hearing may
be in the absence of the accused. The crucial question is the deﬁnition of the
earliest point at which the Crown may act. It is submitted that the Crown must
show that,
(a) the accused left the jurisdiction after either charges were laid or
after a freezing order was made, whichever is the earlier, and
(b) that the departure and absence of the accused is for the purpose of
avoiding the criminal proceedings. It is submitted to be wrong in
principle to subject an accused to this procedure before some legal
proceedings have been put in place.
(c) The Protection OfInnocent Third Parties
The protection of innocent third parties is a major problem only where
the provision in question contemplates the acquisition of or dealing in speciﬁc
assets. Thus, it is a major headache in the context of forfeiture provisions, but
is of no consequence at all in the context of pecuniary penalty orders, because
they merely involve the assessment of a sum of money representing a proﬁt.
However, the protection of innocent third parties is of considerable importance
in the context of freezing orders and powers to execute the order by the seizure
of property. The issues will be deferred to that discussion.
FreezingOrders
It is apparent that the measure must be backed by some power to freeze
some or all of the property of the offender in contemplation of a conﬁscation
order. Otherwise, a forfeiture order (if there are to be such things), may prove
impossible because the asset has been placed beyond reach, or a pecuniary
penalty order may be rendered negatory by reason of the fact that there are no
assets available to meet it“. In addition, effective pretrial restraint may protect
possible future purchasers from trouble, if not substantial loss.
Such freezing orders have appeared on the civil scene in the relatively
recent past. They are generally called “Mareva Injunctions”47. They are designed
to ensure that a successful plaintiff will not be defeated by the defendant moving
'assets out of the jurisdiction, or dissipating them in any way. A considerable
body of law has grown up around the Mareva injunction, but the acceptability
of the general idea has been very widely accepted indeed“.
The use of similar powers in connection with criminal proceedings, absent
special empowering legislation, is not without precedent. The general rule seems
to be that the police have no power to retain the property of the defendant in
a criminal case unless that property is required as evidence, or, of course, it
‘6 Cf. Note, supra note IO at l943—l944. In particular: . . the purpose of the restraint
would be to provide reasonable assurance that the defendant will submit to a proﬁts’ ﬁne
if found guilty.“
‘7 Named after the second instance of its application: Mareva Comparii'a Naviera S.A. v.
International Bulk Carriers SA. [1975] 2 Lloyd’s R. 509 (C.A.).
‘8 The injunctive power has now been recognized and accepted by the mum of each State,
the ACT. and the Federal Court. as well as in New Zealand and Canada.
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belongs to someone else”. However, a series of recent cases in England have
held that the police may obtain an injunction freezing some or all of the assets
of an accused before trial, if those assets are arguably the property of a victim
of crime either because those assets were obtained by the commission of a crime
or represent the proceeds of property so obtained”.
It is not necessary in this paper to analyse these cases in detail. It sufﬁces
to say that the power is very limited: there must be an identiﬁable asset linked
to an identiﬁable victim, for example“, The Hodgson Committee commented:
Such an order is not truly a Mareva injunction at all, since it is
founded on proprietory right rather than on a desire to preserve assets so
that some future monetary orders may be enforced. The only innovation
in those cases, in our view, was that proceedings were brought by the police
rather than by the person or persons whose property had been criminally
obtained“.
It may be of some interest that Galligan J ., of the Ontario High Court, has
held that the Attorney-General also has standing to apply for such an order.
His Honour held:
It seems to me that it is clearly in the public interest that victims of
theft, if possible, be quickly and summarily repaid by the thief. It is hard
to understand why the indignity of theft must have added to it the hazards
and delay of a lengthy civil action. When the Attorney-General seeks to
preserve assets of a thief so that the sentencing judge can have a realistic
possibility of seeing that the thief makes good the victim’s loss, in my
opinion, he is acting in furtherance of the public interest. In doing so I am
satisﬁed that he has status to bring the action and this application”.
It is also of interest to note that this defendant had been convicted and
that the monies frozen were not identiﬁably the actual proﬁts of the theft,
indeed not necessarily related to the theft at all“.
The more important questions in this context are, however, as to the limits
that should be placed on a general statutory grant of a freezing power in the
measure contemplated. A number of important issues are involved.
(a) Criteria For Issue
It is clear that the application would be made on an ex parte basis. The
point of the exercise is to move before the suspect has a chance to frustrate the
process. Thereafter, thing become more murky.
‘9 Hodgson at 106.
5‘ The reported cases are West Mercia Constabulary v. Wagener [I982] l W.L.R. 127 (Q.B.);
Clue/Constable ofKem v. V[l982] 3 All ER. 36 (C.A.); and ChiefConstab/e ofHampshire
v. A [1984] 2 All ER. 385 (C.A.).
Cf. MacFarlane, “Conﬁscating the Fruits of Crime” (1984), 27 Crim. L.Q. 408 at 428—431.
53 Hodgson at 106.
53 (I984) 46 OR. (2d) 452 at 455—456 (Ont.H.C.), affd. (1984) 13 C.C.C. (3d) 575
(Ont.D.C.).
5‘ It seems that the accused stole $120,000 from two charitable institutions. The accused
was the owner of fully paid annuity investments to the value of$l40,000. The investments
were paid up both before and after the oﬁ‘ence was committed, yet all was restrained.
5
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At what point should the application be available? The problem here is to
determine the earliest moment at which the order may be made. The freezing
of the whole or part of assets is a drastic step. Even if the order may be
challenged later, the fact that it has been done will expose the defendant to
expense, opprobrium, and considerable inconvenience. Moreover, it will be
done ex parte. These facts call for special care.
There appear to be at least two competing interests here. On the one hand,
it should not be possible to use the procedure as a harassment technique or
ﬁshing expedition.
On the other hand, it should be possible to move before the‘su'spect has
. knowledge that something is going to happen. The drug provisions of the
various States take various positions on this issue”. It would seem that the
crucial point lies, in much the same way as with search warrants, where charges
are immediately imminent and the authorities have a good case, both on the
offence and the‘ conﬁscation order. It is therefore submitted that the applicant
for the freezing order must (a) show a prima facie case with respect to both the
offence and the likelihood of the conﬁscation order and (b) undertake that
charges relating to the assets the subject of the application will be laid within
forty-eight hours of the freezing order. Itis suggested that failure to comply with
the terms of the undertaking should result in a bar on prosecution with respect
to those assets for six months.
The Crown should be asked to give an undertaking as to costs.
(b) Necessity
A central feature of the Mareva injunction is that the plaintiff must show
that the extraordinary measure is justiﬁed in that there is a substantial risk that
the defendant will either relocate or dissipate the assets in question“. This
feature is notably absent from the drug injunction models”. It should not be.
While it may be argued that there is far more risk that an accused who receives
notice that he or she is to be charged with a major crime will attempt to remove
assets from the reach of the courts then a defendant to a civil action, the court
is quite capable of taking such generalizations into account bearing in mind the
facts of the particular case, the nature of the charges and the assets, the character
and circumstances of the accused and so on. Similar judgments are made every
day in the context of bail applications. The Victorian drug legislation provides
a model in this respect. It requires that the court be “satisﬁed that unless
restrained from doing so the person is likely to dispose of his money or property
to such an extent as to be unlikely to be able to comply with any order made
”58 . .
55 For example, the Victorian Act permits the application to be made where notice of an
intention to apply for a conﬁscation order has been ﬁled with the appropriate court (5.
88 (1)); the N. S.W Act permits an application where “proceedings are being taken” (5.
45AD (l) (a)); and the S.A. legislation permits an application to be made where a person
has been charged (5. 48 (1) (a)). ‘
5" See, for example Third Chandris Shipping Corp. et al. v. Unimarine S.A. [I979] 2 All
E. R. 972 (C.A.)
. 57 For example there is no such conditionin the relevant N.S.W. or S.A. provisions
5" Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act, 5. 88 (l). See also Hodgson at 39.
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(c) Notice
The order, once made on these conditions, will restrain the world from
dealing in the nominated assets under prescribed penalty. But such an order
should be unenforceable against any person until notice has been given to them.
There should be little difﬁculty in giving notice to the holders of such assets,
such as banks, or the accused. The question of future holders will be dealt with
below.
(d) Variation
It is essential that there be some procedure whereby the accused and other
asset holders, or interested parties, can approach the court for variation to the
terms of the order. The bank may wish to continue to withdraw a mortgage
payment from the frozen account—and it should be allowed to do $059. The
accused should be permitted to apply for reasonable living and legal expenses,
and in some cases, sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to permit a business to continue to
operate“. Provision should be mandatory. The freezing of the assets is not
designed to drive a person, perhaps as yet uncharged, and certainly unconvicted,
bankrupt. Other persons should be permitted to argue that they have an hitherto
undisclosed but nevertheless valid legal interest in the property in question. In
short, an ex parte order should be open to challenge from anyone“.
Two more major issues require further discussion. First, the court must be
given the power, subject to what is said below, to substitute one frozen asset
for another62 Thus, for example, if the accused has two bank accounts worth
$10000 each one of which represents criminal proﬁts, and the other does not,
and it appears that the one frozen is unavailable, because it has disappeared,
or is subject to a charge, or is required to pay off a business debt, the court
should have the power to release the one and freeze the other. The substantial
caveat is that all of the preconditions must be satisﬁed before the switch can be
made. It should be noted that this is hardly controversial in the context of a
pecuniary penalty order, for one asset is worth as much as another, but it
imposes difﬁculties for those who would remain with the theology of forfeiture,
“tainted property”. One account is tainted—the other18 not, and it is simply
inconsistent to insist that the switch can nevertheless be made“.
Second, there is the difﬁcult question as to the extent to which the accused
may challenge the validity of the original order. The problem can clearly be
seen; the accused may use the re-hearing, if he or she can, to ﬁsh to see what
59 See, for example, Iraqi Ministry ofDefence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. SA. [1981] QB. 65.
5° See, for example, PCW (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd. v. Dixon [I983] 2 All E.R. l59.
6 In the United States, most courts have held that due process requires a full adversarial
hearing once the assets have been secured. See note, supra note 10, at 1942.
52 This suggestion has been made by a number of writers. See, for example, Pianin, supra
note l2 at 253—254 (in the context of speciﬁc asset forfeiture). At 254 the author remarks:
“The substitute asset proposal also offers protection for third parties. Instead of
requiring forfeiture of the speciﬁc property found in the possession of innocent third
parties, the proposal authorizes the forfeiture of other assets of equal value belonging to
the defendant)”
However, once such a provision is added to forfeiture, it resembles even more closely
a proﬁts ﬁne.
See also the discussion of substitution by Hodgson at 39—40.6 u
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the Crown knows, perhaps intimidate witnesses, or delay, delay, delay. Practice
in committals will demonstrate the strength of such fears. On the other hand,
it is just an ex parte order, not chiselled on stone, and it may be wrong. The
accused must be permitted to demonstrate that fact. Again, it is submitted that
the courts should be trusted, at least in the ﬁrst instance, to know ﬁsh from
fowl.
It can be argued with some justice that, the Crown having shown a prima
facie ease in the original hearing, the accused should be placed in the position
of an applicant, with an onus to lead sufﬁcient evidence to cast doubt on the
original decision. That argument has merit, but avoids the dilemma, for it is
just only if the accused knows the argument he or she has to meet. Proof of an
Undeﬁned negative usually places the accused in an impossible position. Such
a solution would be just only with disclosure, and that leads to a maze of
ideology and detail that the current debate over the role of the committal serves
to demonstrate.
(6) Third Parties
The position of third parties in possession, or with ownership, in their own
right, of assets subject to an initial freezing order, 'is a matter of some
complexity. Some legislation simply deals with the problem by stating that any
subsequent dealing with assets subject to a freezing order is void“. This is
simply indefensible. There is absolutely no reason why that legendary
individual, known as the bona ﬁde purchaser for" value without notice
(B.F.P.F.V.W.N.) should not be protected. Why should the B.F.P.F.V.W.N. pay
for the crimes of another? McGovern, discussed above, is as good an illustration
as any“. ~
Other marginal situations may require some thought. It would be a
mistake, in the criminal jurisdiction, to conform rigidly to the doctrines of the
civil law. Two examples serve to illustrate the point. In Wright, one Miller was
charged and convicted for importing marijuana on his boat. The boat was
returned to him. Miller then sold the boat to a third party, quite properly telling
him that it had been so used. The third party was informed by the Crown that
it did not intend to apply for forfeiture of the boat. After the sale was
completed, the Crown changed its mind. What result“? In Long, it was held
that a purchaser with notice that charges would be laid against the vendor with
respect to the use of the asset in drug trafﬁcking was estopped from arguing
that the transfer was valid“. Is that right?
It may be that the court should be given a discretion to vary or revoke
freezing and conﬁscation orders where the application of the order would work
hardship or injustice“. Such a discretion would also cover the sort of case
6‘ See. for example, section 48 (3) (a) ofthe South Australian legislation, section 1 14 (l) of
the Victorian Act, (sequestration); and section 18 (6) of the Western Australian legislation.
“5 supra note 32.
6“ (1982) 1 COO (3d) 30, (B.C.Co.Ct.). Mr Wright won.
67 (l98l) 654 F2d 9H.
6" See, for example, Hodgson at 126: ‘f. . . . we would allow the Court to have discretionary
power .to restore the goods to third pan donees who had incurred expenditure or
obligations in reliance on the gift.”
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exempliﬁed by the situation in which the only asset available to satisfy the order
is a house containing a spouse and three children who risk being cast into the
street.
(0 Examination Orders
In his ﬁnal report, Mr Costigan recommended that the power to collect
information pertaining to the assets of the accused should include all powers
available in a civil action with the addition of the power to require the oral
examination of the accused on the analogy of company liquidation and
bankruptcy legislation”. That power exists in relation to drugs in the Customs
Act“), although is is not clear from the fact of the legislation that the examinee,
who may be the accused or any other person, may be required to answer. The
Act does provide that the answer given may not be used in other proceedings
except for a prosecution for perjury in the examination, or in the conﬁscation
proceedings themselves“. Of course, however, the mere fact that the answers
may not be used in court does not mean that they cannot be used by the
authorities to further other investigations.
On balance, it is submitted that this power should be available”, subject
to the following limitations.
(1) It should only be available in the case of an offender who has been
convicted;
(2) witnesses other than the offender should have the privilege against
self-incrimination;
(3) the examination can only be for the purpose of discovering the
location of assets which relate to the offence for which the offender ,‘
has been convicted; . ‘
(4) the answer should be inadmissible in evidence except in
proceedings for conﬁscation of those assets and for perjury in the
examination; and
(5) where the witness does not comply voluntarily, the court should be
satisﬁed that the evidence sought cannot be obtained in less
obtrusive ways.
Sequestration
The drug models often provide that the court may, in association with a
freezing order or separate from it, order that an ofﬁcial trustee or equivalent
ofﬁcial, take over the administration of some or all of the assets of the
offender”. The Hodgson Committee recommended as follows:
We recommend the appointment of an ofﬁcial . . . who might be called
the receiver or custodian of property connected with crime. He would
“9 supra note 19 at 4.086.
7° Section 2435.
' Section 243F (3).
4 3 See Hodgson at 105. l09-l l0.
7’ See. for example. 55. 110—116 of the Victorian Legislation.
a
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occupy a position similar to, or else be subordinate to, the Director of
Public Prosecutions. His functions would be; .
(l) to investigate the assets of persons suspected of major crime;
(2) to apply for orders such as those discussed above;
(3) to preserve assets that have been frozen, including where
necessary the management of a business;
(4) to release, under the supervision of the court, assets for the
living expenses of a defendant or the costs of his defence;
(5) to realize and distribute assets upon ﬁnal disposition of a
case”.
In short, such an ofﬁcial would have the major oversight of the
implementation of all of this legislation, including the sequestration
administration.
This is obviously a very drastic measure and should be limited to the most
extreme of cases. The restrictions proposed above on the power to freeze should
be the very minimum safeguards on the use of this power. In addition, it should
be required that the court be satisﬁed that the use of the power is the only way
to achieve the preservation of the assets in question. Such safeguards are notably
missing from the drug legislation models that currently exist. The High Court
has observed of the Customs Act provisions:
Obviously this provision has the potential for a harsh or unjust
operation. A person who innocently derived a small beneﬁt from a dealing
in narcotic goods, not knowing the goods the subject 'of the dealing
contained a narcotic substance, may ﬁnd all his property placed under the
control of the Ofﬁcial Trustee because the application seeks no order with
respect to speciﬁed property”.
Both in this case and in general, the Customs Act provisions should be:
regarded as a national scandal. They should be repealed and replaced, not
imitated. v
Search and Seizure
It is obvious that these measures must be backed by a power to search for
assets and seize them when found. Naturally, all of the policy and legal issues
which surround search and seizure arise in this context. It is not within the
ambit of this paper to retread that already well-trodden ground.
Conclusion
The case for the introduction of a measure to deal with the proﬁts of crime
is a strong one. It is a sad fact, however, that in today’s climate of war on
organized crime brought about by the revelations of a series of Royal
Commissions and sensational allegations, defensible social policy has been lost
in a welter of rhetoric and bandwagon boarding. The result of this is likely to
be ill-considered, overbroad, draconian legislation.
7‘ Hodgson at NO.
75 Re Smilhers (A Judge of the Federal Court of Australia) and Another: ex parte McMiIIari
(1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 125 at 130, dictum in the course of upholding the constitutional validity
of the Customs Ac! scheme.
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The major submissions of this paper are:
(1) While it is defensible social policy to deprive all offenders of any
proﬁts they may have made by the commission of any criminal
offence, in fact there is little need to attack the small ﬁsh of crime,
and it is a waste of time and money to use complicated and
expensive legislative procedures to do so. The legislation should be
aimed at the tOp end of the criminal spectrum.
(2) Although the concept of forfeiture is most often spoken about, in
fact it is unnecessary to use it, it generally produces unjust results,
and the use of forfeiture concepts immeasurably complicates the
proposed measure. In particular, there is no place in defensible
social policy for the concept of civil forfeiture. The focus of the
legislationshould be to attack proﬁts, not licit items which have
been used in the commission of the crime, and to do so by,
essentially, a ﬁne calculated according to the proﬁt made.
(3) The pecuniary penalty order should be backed by carefully limited
supporting measures, notably a power to freeze assets, a power to
place assets in the hands of an ofﬁcial trustee, and adequate powers
of search and seizure. But the initial legislation should err, if at all,
on the side of liberty. This sort of measure is new to Australia, and
should be carefully evaluated. If it turns out. that it can be
demonstrated, with actual examples, that loopholes exist and must
be closed, that is the time to act, (on the basis of real problems,
not imagined ones)
It has not been possible, in this brief look at the general issues, to touch
upon the myriad of details that must be attended to. What courts should have
jurisdiction? What should happen to the conﬁscated assets? What are the duties
of the ofﬁcial trustee? How long should the restraining order remain in force?
What should the relationship be with proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act?
There must be provision for the effect of the orders and their enforcement
interstate. Should the calculation of the proﬁt take account of outgoings? The'
list seems endless. But it can and will be done. The principal purpose of this
paper has been to suggest the broad framework of law and policy, in which light
the task must be approached.
3/
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Matthew Goode
I am a bit nervous about this, just think of it, little boy from Adelaide
come to Sydney to talk about organized crime!
The basic point of the paper that I want to re-emphasize is that I make no
bones about my belief that in general conﬁscation of assets which represent
proﬁts from criminal behaviour is a good idea, but that the rhetoric employed
to justify this course of action has taken over and the result has been legislative
excesses or proposed legislative excesses.
I argue that such legislation should be aimed at the big shots. In the Age
on the 28th February this year it was reported that federal police are after assets
held by Trimboli, Cornwall, Bull and Mark. That is ﬁne by me. What is not
ﬁne by me is the tendency of the legislation or proposed legislation to go after
everything and everybody using deeming provisions and reverse owner clauses
like confetti at a wedding.
I also argue in the paper that the power of forfeiture of property as such
is unnecessary and needlessly complicates the proposals. It does that because
its potential for‘injustice is extremely wide. I think that a broadly-based proﬁts
ﬁne is acceptable.
I had some difﬁculty in writing the paper a month or so ago because
although I had access at that time to Commonwealth and New South Wales
proposals in this area, they were made available to me on a conﬁdential basis.
Since I wrote the paper however South Australian Crimes Conﬁscation of Proﬁts
Bill 1986 hasbecome publicly available and although I do not=think it is has
yet been passed, there is no reason to doubt that it will. In an atmosphere in
which politicians of all sides are climbing over each other to be ‘holier than
thou’ and nasty to organized crime (whatever that may mean) the only word of
criticism may be that the Bill is not draconic enough. There are no votes in
' speaking up for the criminal element.
Nevertheless, I thought it might be appropriate in this forum if I used this
opportunity to point to some of the things in the South Australian Bill which I
see as reasonably typical of proposals at this time in Australia.
Property is liable to forfeiture under the Act for nominated circumstances:
if the property is acquired for the purpose of committing an indictable offence,
if the property is used in connection with the commission of an indictable
offence, if the property is the proceeds of an indictable offence or the property
is property acquired with the proceeds of an indictable offence, or into which
the proceeds of the indictable offence have in some other manner been
converted.
It is in my view, and in my submission, a fact that proper policy would
concentrate on proceeds. It also seems to me that backing up measures in this
Bill substantially broaden its impact. The Act goes on to provide that where
there has been an accretion to the persons property in the consequence of the
commission of an indictable offence that'the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc property
as being liable to forfeiture is not possible for whatever reason the whole- of the
persons property is liable for forfeiture under the Act. Although, of course, on
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an application for actual forfeiture only so much property as is necessary to get
to the sum equal to the value of the accretion should be forfeited but you can,
in fact, make the whole of the persons property liable to forfeiture whether or
not we are dealing with a property worth $50,000 or $500,000.
Once property is liable to forfeiture there are other things attached to it.
Let me take one example. There is an item in this Act called sequestration.
Now, sequestration orders are usually catergorized into two basic headings. The
ﬁrst is like a Mareva injunction, you freeze the particular assets or proﬁts
involved. The second is rather like bankruptcy, you appoint a person to take
over the management of assets and proﬁts of people convicted of criminal
offences. The sequestration order in the South Australian Act is both. Now what
it says is: .
“where the appropriate court is satisﬁed on the application of the Attomey-
General there are reasonable grounds to suspect that certain property is
liable to forfeiture under the Act which may be the whole of the accused’s
property. Also the property is liable to forfeiture under a corresponding
order in another state the court may make a sequestration order.“
So if you can’t identify the profits immediately then the whole of the
property is liable to forfeiture and then you can go to a court and if there is a
reasonable suspicion that it was the proceeds of a criminal offence or used in
the commission of a criminal offence you can freeze the lot or you can take
over its management, ex parte, for up to two months and that is without even
charging anybody.
This type of legislation usually provides some protection for the property
of innocent persons. If you are going to freeze or conﬁscate assets used in the
commission of a criminal offence those may not be the property of the person
who committed it.‘ It is necessary if you are going to have forfeiture powers to
provide for some protection. This Act does that:
“An order fOr forfeiture shall not be made in respect of property of
a person who is innocent of any complicity in the commission of a criminal
offence unless that person acquired or received the property knowing of
its origin or in circumstances such as to arouse a reasonable suspicion as
to its origin.”
Now a thought that immediately sprang to mind were some of those high
powered Q.C.‘s who defended Brian Meagher. They are paid a lot of money—
that money may have come from the commission of criminal offences, and do
you think those Q.C.’s might have a reasonable suspicion as to its origin? If
they do; it is liable to forfeiture and be taken off them. This sort of thing is
fairly typical of this sort of legislation. I try and point out the problems in the
paper and I do not propose to go through them all in detail.
I want to end with a couple of general comments. The excesses that are
involved in the South Australian legislation are common to Australian
proposals. Moreover, the lack of uniform legislation which was embraced as
desirable in principle by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General has
resulted in the failure of the Commonwealth to provide a defensible and
comprehensible model for such legislation. The result has been that- South
Australia, New South Wales and Victoria (at least to my knowledge) will move
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individually in this area and all three proposals which I have seen are different
from the last Commonwealth draft that I saw a little while ago. It is a shambles.
I conclude with agreeing with Mr Costigan. Mr Costigan is quite right
about the reality of governmental response to organizedcrime particularly in
this area as opposed to its rhetoric. I too am left with a feeling of despair.
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J. Parnell, LL.M.
Debate whether there is a “capo il capo”, the state within the state or just
a collection of “capos”, a number of states within the state, is perennial and
really no longer matters. What matters is that there are the professionals,
whether all rounders or specialists, and the amateurs; and, just as “Appalachian
5 7” was proof for USA. “Tai yuen” of more recent memory has been suggested
for Australia; and, at present there is every reason to believe that in the pursuit
of crime, as everywhere else, the amateurs are falling ﬁrst and tying up the whole
system.
It was once said that if George S. Patton had waited for a full logistical
appraisal the Iron Curtain might have fallen over Paris and the same applies
to the pursuit of professional crime. At a quarter to midnight it is a time to go
into action on the subjective judgment of individuals and not co-efﬁcients of
co-relation, however unscientiﬁc this might seem.
“Kefauver” and “McClelland” in USA. and countless encounters in
Australia since have proved conclusively that one “beneﬁt” all professions
embrace and acclaim and treasure is the privilege of silence. Leaving aside the
detection, we must get about the business of convicting the guilty. And, if guilty
amateurs get caught up in the effort, Amen.
Now this matter of silence is much misunderstood. Apart from the special
situation common law contempt nobody has or would suggest that silence
suspects or accused be imprisoned or pressured or chastised till they speak.
What is sought is merely that the tribunal of fact be allowed to consider silence
as a possible inference of guilt. And indeed there are views that such is not
inconsistent with an original rationale of any “privilege” being merely to
“protect against the evil of governmental suppression of ideas”', and that there
has been an illicit extension since. Nevertheless, as the law stands the
“privilege” with its concommitant prohibitions is inviolate and change can only
come through legislation and depending on the content of the proposed Bill of
Rights may be at Federal level.
Whatever be the position, however, citizens in all other ﬁelds of human
relationships feel quite entitled to take an adverse view of silence, and the
ordinary citizens’ perplexity as to what is perceived to be an artiﬁcial criminal
law procedure was never highlighted better than in the abortive question in R.
v. Grecian-King, where a judiciary, hamstrung by the artiﬁcial rules, was
powerless to explain.
Hitherto lawyers have monopolized the discussions on the place of silence
and the fruit is the privileged position of the professional criminal on trial.
Henceforth perhaps we ought to more readily realise that ordinary non
professional citizens have a role, indeed a right, to act in formulation and
retention of principles which affect ordinary non professional citizens. Indeed
we ought to remember the most enduring legal system of modern times is “the
Code” (Napoleon) much the product of a soldier, not a lawyer. I suggest the
place for the beneﬁt of silence is the void beyond Mariner 10. The corollary
' The Challenge ofCrime in a Free Society US. Government Printing Ofﬁce, page 306.
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may be a mutual compulsory pre-trial discovery perhaps by an examining
magistrate.2 ‘
Turning to the' conﬁscation of criminal proﬁts and the’position'of third
parties (Matthew Goode', page 53) such parties may be bonaiﬁde or not and if
the latter I suggest there is already legislation in place which, with slight
modiﬁcationg'would assist —-. Section 527C — the “goods in custody” is suCh.
When the High Courtruled recently that money could not be traced,- the
Government of New South vWales should have legislated immediately to allow
tracing and incidentally to bring the-artiﬁcial rules of the criminal law into» line
with general law and equity.3 Nothwithstanding, if the time limits on summary
proceedings had not been in existence similar charges could have been
particularised at the teller’s cage and perhaps prosecuted against the depositor,
with possible access then to the bank’s funds. In any event 5. 527C with an
extended meaning to “things”, removal of the time limit, and an option for trial
and indictment with a realistic penalty of say ten years could be a powerful
weapon against professionals.
I commend these suggestions for your consideration.
1 lbid.. page 308.
3‘147 CLR. 503.   
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John Parnell, LL.M.
There are two proposals in my paper. One is on this question of silence. I
think that is pretty obvious and that eventually when the public wake up to the
position of silence, that silence will go. The second proposal is a bit more
devious. It involves some of the matters which Mr Goode was speaking about
as an extension of s. 527C of the Crimes Act. Make no mistake if the
modiﬁcations I suggest are introduced it will hurt and the sting will also occur
in the area just mentioned by Mr Goode. Legislation on these lines is/very
valuable and indeed it just recently came to my notice that in Hong Kong there
have been some very successful moves about corruption. Instead of the
Commissioner of Taxation sending you a letter to explain unforeseen proﬁts,
the Commissioner 'of Police arrives for an explanation. If you do not explain, '
in you go. .
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Sue Arnold, Co-ordinator, Australians for Animals.
1 am surprised that none of the speakers has addressed the illegal trafficking
in fauna which appears to go hand in hand with the drug trade, and also appears
to be very symptomatic of the behaviour of organized crime. I would ask the
three speakers: are they aware that each state has a different fauna Act or
National Parks and Wildlife Service Act; that there is free ﬂowing of fauna
between the states because of s. 92 of the Constitution; that it has become
evident that the Wildlife Protection Act is not properly being enforced; that in
the Northern Territory alone there are 900 airports or airstrips that are not
covered by any surveillance; that many of the coastal ports in Australia are only
manned between Monday and Friday from 8 o’clock to 5 o’clock; that we have
identiﬁed private dealers overseas who have huge collections of Australian fauna
and birds which are more representative than that which we have left in this
country? I ask how can this illegal laundering of our fauna and our birds, which
is decimating the wild life of this country, be dealt with by the projected Tax
Investigation Branch or by the police? Who is going to accept the responsibility
of what is happening to our fauna and how can this be dealt with?
Matthew Goode
I have absolutely every sympathy with what was more a statement than a
question. I would merely remark that properly casted conﬁscation of proﬁts
legislation would help deal with that.
I would also like to make one totally unrelated comment which I ought to
have made at the outset. The Chairman mentioned that I had worked for the
Victorian Attorney-General and I ought to make it clear that my views do not
necessarily represent policy of that Department.
Frank Costigan, Q. C.
I would just say that all the material Sue Arnold mentioned I know of
and I agree with, and there are enormous problems. The same kind'of problems
in dealing with that as a matter of law enforcement as there are With the other
problem areas. The fact that I did not mention that was only because I wanted
to limit my paper to 20 pages rather than 2 000.
Rod Howie, Director, Criminal Law Review Division, Attorney-General’s
Department.
I must say that I ﬁnd it extraordinary that Mr Goode would come here
and talk about conﬁscation of proﬁts and not once mention in his paper or in
his presentation the New South Wales legislation which is the Crimes
Conﬁscation ofProﬁts Act, passed in November, 1985, and from then onwards
has been a public document. Why I ﬁnd that extraordinary, apart from Mr
Goode’s expertise and experience, is that a reference to it would, in fact, reduce
much of his paper to mere idle speculation about what might or might not
occur.
The Act has been passed and it is quite speciﬁc. It is not just four sections,
it is a lengthy document. It proves at once that Mr Goode’s ﬁrst assumption is
incorrect—that the Act is .intended to replace and will replace the drug
provisions in the Poisons Act or in the new Drug Misuse and Traﬂicking Act
which contains no provisions in relation to conﬁscation. This Act will be an
Act for all offences.
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I ﬁnd it also extraordinary that he will make a statement, which perhaps
might be found offensive to the draftsman and the New South Wales
Government, that legislation will be, or is likely to be “ill-considered, overboard
or draconian”. There is not one word in Mr Goode’s paper as to whether this
Act is such legislation. It might have been of worth to people here to have had
some analysis of the New South Wales legislation which was enacted last year
and is awaiting regulations and Supreme Court Rules.
Much of what Mr Goode raised both in his presentation and in his paper
is not found in the New South Wales legislation. The horror stories found in
his paper have no place in New South Wales under its legislation. The Vickers
case could not occur here and it seems to me to be irrelevant to come here and
raise these matters when New South Wales has already legislated.
He would ﬁnd on analysis of that Act that there is protection for third
persons; protection for people who have absconded; that there is a burden of
proof of conviction before a conﬁscation order can be made in most
circumstances. It would be also evident to anybody reading his paper that it
seems by mere chance, or serendipity on behalf of the draftsman, that many of
the practical and speciﬁc recommendations which Mr Goode makes in his paper
are, in fact, in the New South Wales legislaion of November, 1985.
Those matters raised by Mr Goode about what happened in South
Australia are not found in the New South Wales Act. Under the New South
Wales legislation, for example, before any sequestration orders can be made
there must be a charge, or, in the case of absconding, the Court must be satisﬁed
that there will be a charge within 48 hours—a practical matter which Mr Goode
raised in his paper which, as I say, had already found its way into the New
South Wales legislation.
There has been a lot of speculation about the New South Wales legislation
and a lot of concern by people that it would be draconian, that it would take
away civil liberties.
Mr Goode might have shown us whether it did in fact do this and what it
did, rather than raise speculations about what it might have done.
Matthew Goode
Firstly, my purpose in writing the paper was not to write paeans of praise
of the New South Wales draftsmen. My purpose in writing the paper was to
address the general issues that arise in framing this legislation in the ﬁrst place.
Secondly, the copy of the New South Wales legislation that I had when I
drafted the paper was supplied to me on a conﬁdential basis. I did not feel at
that time to spend a great deal of time writing a paean of praise to the New
South Wales draftsman. One of the reasons why the New South Wales Act may
have turned out the way it has was because I was involved in discussion with
the Commonwealth and with New South Wales at the time that those drafts
were being circulated. I am happy to see, for example, that the New South Wales
legislation applies not only to offences generally but also repeals the equivalent
drug offences. That was a reversal of a stand taken earlier on.
I do not regard it as my job in dealing with the issues that arise in
conﬁscation andforfeiture of assets generally to deal with detailed analysis of
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all the models that are available. The Director of the Criminal Law Division
might like to comment on whether or not things that I do not raise in my paper
about the necessity for forfeiture provisions generally are well argued, or
whether he has some principled objection to what I have to say about it, or,
indeed, the analysis of the R.I.C.O. legislation which led me to that point. This
matter he does not deal with. There are a number of other things that he could
have dealt with. I am sorry if he feels offended but offending sensibilities is one
of those things that we are about.
R. W. Job, Q.C., Chairman, State Drug Crime Commission
I am still reeling a little bit from some of Mr Costigan’s remarks in his
reﬂections. First of all Mr Costigan’s concern that there may be a wall erected
around New South Wales by virtue of the formation of that body, and that this
is the intention of government. I can not speak for the intentions of government,
I can only look at the Act itself and would comment that the legislation which
formed the Commission had the support of all political parties in New South
Wales.
Again, a member of the National Crime Authority is on the Committee of
Management of the State Drug Crime Commission and that is one of the
persons who makes decisions on what matters will be referred to the
Commission. So you can see therefore there can be no way in which the State
Drug Crime Commission and the National Crime Authority would step on each
other’s toes or get in each other’s way.
The Crime Commission Act of New South Wales provides for close liaison
between the two bodies. The Act also provides that if offences against the
Commonwealth become apparent in the course of an investigation conducted
by my Commission, then we would be obliged to forward details of that to the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
Already there has been a cldse relationship between the NCA and the New
South Wales Drug Crime Commission. We are brand new, as you know, we are
‘ only a ﬂedging body but we have received the utmost cooperation from the
NCA. Be assured when we get fully going we will give them as much assistance
as we can. Perhaps it should also be said that both the NCA itself and the SDCC
are relatively small bodies. They are dealing with high level crime and there
should be no fear that there is not enough drug related crime to go around.
Frank Costigan, Q.C.
I assume that it is appropriate for me to comment.
I do not quite know why you thought I should be impressed by the fact
that it had the support of all political parties in New South Wales—I was not
aware of that fact when I read the Act and I do not believe that it would affect
my reading of the Act.
Of course, I knew that the Committee of Management has on it a
representative of the National Crime Authority. What I did not say in my paper
is that the real question that ought to be asked is why are you setting it up? It
is a problem that needs to be dealt with on a national level. There is not any
decent drug importation that occurs in this country that has not got some
interstate either distribution or ﬁnancial implications, and any thing of that kind
needs to be looked at on a national basis. When you set up a body like the
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National Crime Authority; is that not the appropriate body to be looking at
these things rather than having individual state bodies which get ﬁrst look at
the investigation? It seems to me to be an enormous dissipation of resources
to be setting up bodies particularly in the drug area which, of its nature, is a
national problem and not a state problem. Indeed, it is an international
problem, but within Australia it is a national problem. The resources should be
directed to bodies like the National Crime Authority. If they can not do it
properly because they do not have the powers, then you have a good look at
whether you ought to restructure that body, but you do not cure the problem
by setting up State bodies. That is really the nub of my complaint; and the
question I think ought to be asked, is, why do you need a State body? There is
I suspect a real problem in answering it.
Dr Gram Ward/aw
I would just like to endorse the comments that Mr Costigan made. I think
the other general point that is needed to be examined in more detail is what is
the effect of the proliferation of enforcement bodies on the expertise and the
central role of police forces in Australia. It seems to me that because we perceive
that there are problems with policing we do not look enough at how we can
reform police agencies to the extent that that is necessary to do the job that
society believes they are incapable of doing. The proliferation of specialized
agencies in my view detracts from the centrality of policing—the ordinary
conceived policing role. Also there is this whole question of dissipation of
resources. Presumably a lot of the investigators for the new bodies are going to
be in fact the investigators from police forces. I think there are a number of
problems there and that we have not thought through enough the consequences
of the different organizations interrelationships.
Dr Alex Sharah, Psychiatrist
I am a psychiatrist in private practice and the reason I am speaking here
is because I am very interested in what is going to happen to the addicts. I am
at that end of the scale where I am treating a number of heroin addicts. Since
the early 70’s there has been a progressive rise in the number of heroin addicts
for whatever reason. We had in place a type of treatment which we inherited
from America using Methadone and rehabilitation procedures, and around 1977
there was a cessation of the use of Methadone for the addicts throughout
Australia, except in Queensland. It ceased completely in Northern Territory and
Tasmania, it is almost complete in Victoria (probably no more than a hundred
there), in New South Wales it was reduced to a minimum except for those that
were already on it from one particular treatment agency in Sydney which had
a certain number and made up 99 per cent of the people who were on during
those years. It is only in the last year has there been a change after Mr Blewett
and Mr Mulock went overseas and came back with the discovery that
Methadone is wonderfully effective.
I would just like to point out that I am allowed to treat 120 patients, that
is all, and I have to work extremely hard to achieve it. One hundred and twenty
patients treated for one month stop spending within the range of one to two
million dollars per month which means that they therefore do not net between
ten and twenty million dollars for that month in criminal activities.
The use of Methadone in that period by those would not cost more than
$500.00 to the State, not to mention my fee. This is the addict on the street.
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This is the ordinary person. Your child, my child, becomes an obsessive user
of heroin and hence is in daily need to ﬁnd funds for that habit. It is a matter
of necessity—it is not like smoking marijuana (which they can do when they ,
like) and many of the drugs where there is no great urgency, but with heroin
there is an overwhelming compulsion to do it and hence there is almost an
obsessive committal of crime of all types.
This is controlled easily in the majority of these people from the ﬁrst dose
of this particular substance. It is obvious to anybody—you have to be deaf,
dumb, blind and stupid not to see it, and yet we have to have Mr Mulock and
Mr Blewett go overseas to come back and tell us that. I just make that point
because Mr Wardlaw was stating that we have placed tremendous emphasis on
policing but not enough on looking at the people who are actually involved,
studying them and what they say. I think that that is a terribly important aspect.
I would like to add that in association with Max Smith, M.P. (Independent
Member for Pittwater, N.S.W.), one of the only speakers against the Bill to set
up the State Drug Crime Commission in New South Wales, we have started
the Human Rights for Addicts Movement because it is incredible that we can
have in our society a growing body of sufferers, more sinned against than
sinners, who cannot receive treatment. The treatment is available but it is
available to so few and on a discriminatory basis under extraordinarily stringent
conditions. We have allowed the horrendous suffering of these people, and I
bring this point to the distinguished panel to ask their views as to what we can
do to right the wrong in this area.
Frank Costigan, Q. C.
There is a terrible human problem for addicts. In Victoria there should be
many more places where addicts can be treated. Victoria is very badly off, but
I do know that there is not just one way of curing addicts—there is a whole
range of different ways. You have to look at the particular person, the particular
personality; one might be suited to Methadone, one might be suited to Odyssey,
one might be suited to a different kind of treatment. I do not know the answer.
I suspect that one wants a range of viable kinds of treatment. I do not know
which is viable but certainly one cannot loose sight of the enormous human
problem involved in the treatment of addicts when one is at the same time
pursuing those who are bringing the drug into the country and selling it.
Ultimately one pursues those who are involved in this trade because of the effect
they are having on the kind of people that Dr Sharah is treating.
Dr' Grant Wardlaw
I think that Dr Sharah is quite right in saying that we have put far too
much emphasis away from the demand side of the equation, but, by the same
token, the same sort of criticisms that I have made of the lack of evaluation of
the enforcement policies I would make just as strongly of the lack of evaluation
of education and treatment policies. We simply at this stage do not have data
to be able to decide which treatment modalities or combination of modalities
are most effective for which particular sections of various drug using
populations. My reading of the literature on Methadone is that certainly it is
an important modality as a crime reduction treatment. There is no doubt about
it as far as my analysis of the literature is concerned that people who are in
Methadone treatment programmes commit less crime, but they do not stop
committing crime by any means.
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I do not know where Dr Sharah obtained his ﬁgures about the amounts
needed to maintain heroin habits, but they are the kind of very high ﬁgures
which are often bandied about, and often because of the belief that speciﬁcally
with heroin everybody that starts using heroin of necessity ends up with a raging
habit. I think the evidence is emerging more and more that that is only true
for a proportion of people using heroin. Once again we do not know the exact
size of that proportion but certainly a signiﬁcant number of people who use
heroin can do so intermittently and without getting involved in the high use
rate and the high crime to supply the habit spiral that certainly occurs with some
people. I just make those qualiﬁcations.
Matthew Goode
While 1 would not want to dissent from anything the questioner said it is
necessary to say that there is deﬁnitely a strong argument that while the costs
to the community of heroin addiction are high, there is a very strong argument
that the cost to society of alcoholism and nicotine addiction are far, far higher.
David Brown, Law School, University of New South Wales
I would like to make ﬁve points of a very general nature.
First of all I would like to congratulate Grant Wardlaw on his paper which
I think is quite a welcome antidote to the rather tedious and repetitive diet of
moralism, self promotion and scare mongering which has characterized the
organized crime debate in Australia in recent years.
The ﬁrst point I would like to make is a general point about deﬁnitions.
As Grant Wardlaw said, most forms of conventional crime require some degree
of organization. Indeed criminologists and historians of crime have shown how
changes in the technical and social organization of crime are connected with
the development of new forms of property, developments in law enforcement
practices and a complex of other changes in the social structure which provide
the conditions of existence of various forms of criminal enterprise. So if
organized crime is to be deﬁned as crime involving some form of organization,
planning, etc., then this is not necessarily to distinguish it in any way from
conventionally deﬁned crime. An approach to organized crime which
conceptualizes it in terms of a political economy of illegal markets, illegal
practices and relations and their varied economic, political, ideological, cultural,
and other conditions of existence is a considerable improvement on the rather
ritual moralistic search for evil individuals, Mr Bigs and Mr Big-enoughs which
permeates the endlessly recycled analysis of Bob Bottom et al.
The second point is in relation to language. Unfortunately a lot of the
debate, conducted from all sides of the political spectrum, as Grant Wardlaw
correctly characterizes, has been in terms of metaphor and in particular the
notion of organized crime as a cancer has been clearly the most popular,
redolent with all the images of virulence, infection, contagion, and an eating
away of society which is graphically captured in the title to Athol Moﬁitt’s recent
book A Quarter to Midnight. So much has the body politic been eaten away
that we have only a metaphorical ﬁfteen minutes in the ﬁnal hour to avert an
irreversible terminal condition. I have not the time to go into that kind of
metaphorical language at the moment other than to say, perhaps, that it involVes
a fundamental misconception of the social phenomena under analysis, and
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moreover a misconception that serves to bolster moralistic, individualistic, and
law and order responses.
The third point in relation to organized crime is the notion of an external
threat. Another central characteristic of the recent Australian debate has been
to conceive of organized crime as bearing a relationship of externality to
Australian society, Australian way of life, Australian character, and so on.
Organized crime is thus conceived as some sort of enemy, an enemy within, a
fourth column, a cancer and so on, fundamentally from outside, alien, different,
separate, not of us, and so on. Now, amongst the number of effects such a
conception has is, ﬁrstly, to deﬂect enquiry from the relationship between
organized crime and the State and in particular organizations like the police;
secondly, it connects very squarely at key points with thinly disguised racist
stereotypes. So organized crime is identiﬁed with racial and national minorities,
and this process is assisted by the persistent use of key code words which
themselves come to signify both organized crime and a particular ethnic
community. One has only to spike an account with constant references to Tongs,
Triads, Yakusa, Godfathers, Honorary Societies and so on to appear to validate
those accounts.
The fourth general point is the hegemony of lawyers and law enforcement
‘solutions’. Again Grant Wardlaw’s paper illustrates how in the drug ﬁeld the
debate has been conducted under the hegemony of lawyers and the law
enforcement approach. The moralism and demonology of prominent journalistic
accounts of organized crime has fed into conservative law and order analyses
and ‘solutions.’ Usually the ‘solutions’ are more resources for law enforcement
agencies and an obsession with suppressing organized crime. Completely ignored
usually is the enormous literature which suggests, on the contrary, that law
enforcement should be considered as only one of the factors inﬂuencing crime—-
a factor which has never been as signiﬁcant as other social and economic and
cultural factors. I think that one of the key elements in developing a more
adequate debate in this area is to break the hegemony of the law enforcement
approach and its reduction of complex issues to a concern with the numbers of
prosecutions and the amount of new public resources poured into law
enforcement agencies. I think that one of the implications of Grant Wardlaw’s
work is, indeed, that if there is a single political programatic lesson to be drawn
from such studies, it is that no more public funds should be allocated to law
enforcement programmes in speciﬁc crime areas.
My last point is by way of a warning and I think it reﬂects on some of the
comments Mr Costigan made about the Sydney scene. There are currently, in
New South Wales in particular, indications that a very complex series of very
speciﬁc and contradictory issues in the criminal justice area are being linked
and woven into a unity. The principle of their articulation is a simplistic form
of law-and-order politics which seeks to foment and exploit retributive, punitive,
and repressive sentiments and practices. Thus the moralism and the
correctionalism of organized crime and corruptive debates is linked to an
obsessive concern with illegal drugs, judicial homilies on the theme of a
disintegrating society, a series of spectacular brutal murders, calls for the re-
introduction of the death penalty, media sensationalism, and political
opportunism from all parties in responding to various criminal justice issues,
judicial sabotage of legislation attempting to reduce the length of the sentence,
prison overcrowding, escapes, debates over remissions and parole, attacks on
prison conditions, the promotion of heroes and villains and a host of other
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particular issues. Let none of us here, particularly those who in their work seek
to fuel such a simplistic law-and-order climate of opinion, be under any illusions
of the dangers inherent in such a road. The effects of fostering a climate of
vindictiveness may outrun the wildest respressive dreams of the moral
entrepreneurs and rebound on us all.
Frank Costigan QC.
I do not know how to respond. Quite frankly I just regard what I heard as
nonsense. I think it is a pity that people make statements of that kind, and say
that an enormous literature has been written about all these things.» Most of the
books to which David Brown is referring, and which tend to become a snowball
exercise when somebody writes a book about another book, are written by
people who have never sat through the kind of trial which is going on in Victoria
at the moment. They have never sat through, as I have, months and months of
hard facts about which conclusions can be drawn. I think that you know there
is an enormous intellectual slide in that kind of adjectival attack on concepts
of morality. It is absolutely wrong, of course, to allow emotions or concepts of
morality to affect the way in which you come to conclusions. There is nothing
wrong once you have come to a valid intellectual conclusion in getting angry
about the conclusion you have come to. That is a different matter altogether,
and if you are ﬁnding, for example, that there are people in this community
who are lying and thieving and corrupting and inﬂuencing young people and
you are satiﬁed about that as a matter of hard evidence, then it is no good
saying that there is something wrong in being moralistic about it and saying
that it ought not to be allowed to happen in this community. I just cannot agree
with a single word that David Brown said. I think his attitude is destructive
and it is not helpful to the debate at all.
Vice-Admiral David Leach, State Drug Crime Commission of New South Wales
There can be no doubt to ﬁght a successful war you need a strategy that
is based on good intelligence, and Dr Wardlaw said that we did not have enough
intelligence. I think that we have enough intelligence to show that there is a
problem, a very big problem which came out of the Royal Commissions. I
would be interested to know from Dr Wardlaw how he would propose
universities and research Institutes could give us a better data base when they
obviously cannot have the powers of Royal Commissions. I would be interested
to know more about how the Rand Organization got its information on which
to make its judgments, and how would he see this being developed in Australia.
I think we could all agree that we need more intelligence on which to base
strategies before we go into any of the options suggested in Dr Wardlaw’s paper.
Dr Grant Wardlaw
I think that enforcement agencies have adequate intelligence to take
enforcement action, but what they do not have is the broader based data. The
Rand analysis was basically an economic one that took all of the estimates of
amounts of drugs brought into the country, amounts spent on drugs, number
of addicts and so forth from all the different official agencies, tried to put
estimates of reliability on that information, and then used that to form an
economic analysis. I think that is a very important part of the type of academic
research that can inform enforcement and the drug strategy generally.
 71
Peter Reuter, the researcher from Rand who actually conducted the
enforcement section of the Rand study, and I are, in fact, at the moment trying
to get sufﬁcient Australian data together to provide a ﬁrst bite at Australian
estimates of the same nature as he did for the United States. The difﬁculty that
we have found is that basic reliable information at a State level, for example,
estimates of numbers of users of different sorts of drugs, just does not exist and
particularly not over a reasonable period of time. So, I think we need to look
at that sort of basic information. Information about market structures and so
forth can only come from interviewing people who are involved in the drug
scene.
The type of proposal that we are thinking of at the moment, for example,
is looking at trafﬁcking under the protection of conﬁdentiality under one of the
various Acts. We hope to try and interview people who have been at the top
or near the top, as we perceive it, of trafﬁcking chains and ﬁnd out from them
about the sorts of things that I outlined in the paper (see pages 25-28); how
easy it was for them to get into high level trafﬁcking? How many experiences
at a middle level they had to have? How long they had to have before they were
moved into a high level? How easy it is to suddenly start off higher up the chain
and buy a large amount of stuff and bring it into the country and get rid of it
i.e., operating at two levels? One way is to look at ofﬁcial sources and try to
make more sense of them, make them more reliable, make the collections more
complete, and the other is to do a lot of street level and intensive interviewing
with people involved in the drug scene. That is what we propose to do but such
material is currently not available in Australia.
May I just say that there are some models, particularly in the United States,
for example New York State Substance Abuse Services, which run very, very
impressive street level units which make estimates of the amount of drugs that
are being used in particular locations e.g., sold outside subways, sold at schools
and so forth, and are doing economic analyses and background analyses of
people that are involved in drug use, how they got into it, what their patterns
of use are, how they ﬁnance their habits and so on. That is information that
can only come from people outside enforcement agencies under some sort of
protection of conﬁdentiality.
Beverley Schurr, New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties.
The Council’s criticism of the State Drug Cn'me Commission has been not
only that it is redundant, but that it takes away some of the protections that
people appearing before the National Crime Commission have. The Council
views some of the movements these days in the attack of the war on organized
crime as really being a war on civil liberties. Much of the terminology creates
the impression of crisis and gives the impression that many of the powers that
are being sought by the law enforcement departments will only be temporary
powers, but, in fact, often these powers and the invasion of rights are never
given back.
The Council is often accused of being a front for organized crime,
supporting and defending the criminals in society. Our answer to that is not
only do we express the rights that the criminal justice system has set up over
centuries to protect people accused by the State, but we also march under the
revolutionary banner of the Auditors-General and also their American
counterparts, the General Accounting Ofﬁce, because it is often shown that
powers that are being sought would be redundant, that government agencies
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have already more than enough powers to enforce the laws as they exist. The
Auditor-General has often shown in Australia that Social Security and
Immigration Departments have powers to stop the fraud that is being
conducted, that there is no need for an ID card. The General Accounting Oﬂice,
I see in Dr Wardlaw’s paper, says that the extensive powers being given to the
drug enforcement agencies in the United States are having very little impact on
changing the extent of drug use.
Keeping those two issues in mind, we now face further threats in Australia
with the proposal for the massive extension of the telephone tapping powers
and also the introduction of a national ID card and number system. At present
our Federal telephone tapping law is the most draconian compared with
Canada, United States and Britain. We lack the basic protections of established
pre-trial procedures to discover illegal tapping, we lack any provision for
damages for victims of illegal tapping, we have very low criminal penalties for
people who undertake illegal telephone tapping, and we have very broad powers
for warrants that are much wider than any in comparable countries, and yet it
is proposed that the law should be extended to State police and should be
extended to other offences. The Council’s position is, of course, that these added
protections from overseas should be included in the law.
I should like to ask Mr Costigan if he could expand on some of his remarks
reported in the press about the ID card: that it was an example of an over-
authoritarian reaction on behalf of governments when, in fact, power already
exists to solve all kinds of problems that the community sees as organized crime.
Frank Costigan, Q. C.
I suppose I should have expected that, having mentioned ID cards in an
aside. It is a good example I think of the way in which one ought to approach
these problems. Anyone who pretends that Acts like the State Drug Commission
Act, The National Crime Authority Act, The Royal Commissions Act and a whole
host of other Acts do not impinge on civil liberties is playing with unreality.
They do impinge on civil liberties. What I have constantly said over the last
three or four years is that if you are going to introduce new legislation or give
new powers you have ﬁrst of all to recognize that you are affecting civil liberties,
and you have then to justify that intrusion into civil liberties by showing the
nature of the problem that you are trying to cope with and that the only way
that you can cope with it is by the introduction of those intrusions. Now, in
some of my reports I said that the particular problem was of such an order that
it could be dealt with only by the giving of additional powers to certain speciﬁed
people and I accept responsibility for that. But I think you should never do that
without asking yourself the question: Is it necessary to make that intrusion into
civil liberties and is the problem that you are trying to cope with of sufﬁcient
importance or capable only of being solved by that intrusion? Having articulated
the problem then you have to make up your mind whether you are prepared to
wear the problem without the intrusion or make the intrusion in the hope that
the problem goes away. That has to be an individual decision, but you can not
make that decision without articulating it.
The ID card is the classic example of an attempt by overkill to cure a
problem. My ﬁrst reaction to the introduction of the Australia Card in the
middle of last year was one of concern. I did not really understand what it was
all about, why they were doing it, what was involved, what was the problem it
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was going to solve. Over the last six months I have been getting an accumulation
of material particularly material prepared by government, from the Health
Commission and it is becoming the most enormous bureaucratic monolith
which is going to employ 3 or 4 000 people on their own estimates. You can
double that by the end of this decade. The ﬁrst estimate of cost a couple of
weeks ago was 1.1 billion, it was suddenly revised to 500 million. I think both
ﬁgures are too low. It is the most enormous intrusion into civil liberties that
this country has yet seen—in ten years time when you look back on it you will
realize what has happened. The beneﬁts to be gained from it are illusory. I think
it is the greatest con trick that has been attempted to be played on this
community. It has been rationalized on the basis of ﬁgures which are going to
be recovered by government in terms of lost income. Those ﬁgures are as woolly
as anything you would ever see, and there is no reason to believe that the great
bulk of those ﬁgures could not be collected by traditional and incredibly more
cheap methods. I think what is being done on the Identity Card is a national
scandal, and just sense that there is a growing feeling in the community against
it. I hope it continues to grow and it is recognized.
Dr Grant Wardlaw
I would just like to say something speciﬁcally about telephone tapping
powers. I think that the question that we need to ask, and I have said this in
the paper and I just re-emphasize it, is not whether those sort of powers are
going to be successful in catching more drug trafﬁckers and people higher up
the chain. The evidence is there that they work at that level. The question is,
does arresting those people affect the eventual policy goal of stopping harmful
drug use? That case has not been made at all as far as I am aware by any of
the enforcement agencies, and until someone can demonstrate that there is a
link between what is the desired ﬁnal goal and locking up trafﬁckers by whatever
means then I do not consider that there is any justiﬁcation for any more
intrusive powers of any sort. I think we have to be able to prove at least at
some level of acceptability that there is a link between the results that we are
going to get in enforcement terms and the result in the reduction of drug use
that is harmful to the community.
Robert Bromwich, Sydney Ofﬁce of the Director of Public Prosecutions
I wish to take issue with Mr Goode’s paper in one particular aspect and
that is in respect to the notion that conﬁscation of assets should be taken
pursuant to the criminal model. He suggests that conﬁscation should only take
place after the trigger has been set off, as he describes it, by proof to a criminal
standard that an offence has taken place. I take issue at that at two levels. First,
the general level: I would submit the standard of proof is higher in criminal
convictions against an individual because of the concern to protect the liberty
of individuals. No such concern does or should exist for property.
Secondly, at a more speciﬁc level and this is in relation to his paper. He
refers to a case of Vickers v. Minister for Business and Consumer Aﬂairs (pages
38-39). He said that “the $8,000 was not returned despite the acquittal. Morling
J. held that he would not have found beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Vickers
was involved in the importation of drugs but he could ﬁnd so on the balance
of probabilities.” When you actually refer to the decision in that case Justice
Morling was very careful to separate the criminal and civil, and I submit that
that would take place in all cases—they would be quite separate. In that case
Justice Morling said “Because it is possible to determine the issues that arise
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in these proceedings without making any ﬁnding whether the applicant did in
fact illegally import heroin into Australia, it is desirable that no such ﬁnding
should be made”.
I would ask him [Mr Goode] to substantiate his reasons for maintaining a
criminal standard of proof for the conﬁscation of assets, being an action against
property, and draw analogies with civil law, such as assault, where there is also
a civil component. I would also invite Mr Costigan to make comments to the
criticisms of his suggestion that conﬁscation of assets should precede, in many
cases, criminal convictions.
Matthew Goode
The ﬁrst point that you make is a very important one. It is one that needs
to be carefully thought about and resolved. It is true that the conception of the
civil action for conﬁscation in the United States in particular has been one in
which the action is against the property. So you get cases called United States
v. One 1975 Plymouth Sedan. I am not convinced that to call something civil
and surround it with such trumpery says anything other than you have changed
labels. I think that if I am an individual who has been charged with a criminal
offence, say like Mr Vickers, and who has been acquitted of that criminal
offence, that it is a nonsense to say that I am not being punished for what
amounts to criminal behaviour if I have in effect been ﬁned $8,000, or I have
my yacht removed from under me. To say that it is “civil” is just playing with
labels. That is part of the reason that I reached the conclusion that I did. '
I take your point about Vickers. I would answer it by saying Mr Justice
Morling did in fact make that ﬁnding, whether or not he said it should be
avoided if possible. My point about Vickers is not the civil/criminal point so
much but that this sort of prosecutorial behaviour breaches at least the spirit
of autrefois in that in effect the Crown is having a second go at Mr Vickers
after he had been acquitted and basically on the same charge—again the point
is that by changing the lables you do not change the reality. IfI am going to be
deprived of $8,000, and you call it a ﬁne, it is exactly the same if I am going
to be deprived of $8,000 and you do not call it a ﬁne.
Frank Costigan, Q. C.
There are some cases where not so much the conﬁscation as the freezing
of assets or property should precede criminal conviction. I know of a number
of cases myself, which I am afraid I cannot speak about in detail, where the
people involved were in the process of moving their assets outside the country.
Now, on each occasion they were ultimately convicted. The amounts were very
large indeed and if there had been no ability to place a Mareva injunction on
their assets before the trial came up there would have been no assets in this
country. They were in the actual documentary stages of moving them out of
the country. There has to be a proper built-in protection in the event that there
is no conviction. There has to be a power in certain kind of cases to take steps
to prevent or freeze the assets prior to trial and prior to conviction. It is a very
complicated subject. I am in sympathy with a lot of what Matthew Goode says.
I would not like the job of drafting the Act. IfI did, I would want a bit of time
to do it. There are lots of complications. There are questions of standard of
proof, and onus of proof, type of property, pecuniary penalties, forfeiture and
so on. I think it is a complicated matter but the general principle is that
criminals should not proﬁt from the criminal activity. How you identify that
proﬁt and how you ensure that he does not proﬁt by it is not easy.
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Matthew Goode
I have absolutely no quarrel with the general proposition that a freezing
order of the type mentioned, generally called Mareva injunctions, is necessarily
desirable in certain cases, and as Mr Costigan very carefully said “in certain
cases”. Unfortunately the reality is that in the draft bill (including the apparently
marvellous New South Wales one) there is a difference between the Mareva
injunction and the criminal injunctive power, i.e., under the Mareva injunction
you have to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court the necessity to use
that power. Under the draft of the New South Wales legislation that I have seen
and under the South Australian Bill that is not necessary. In other words it
seems to be contemplated as a normal event.
Gill Boehringer, Senior Lecturer in Law, Law School, Macquarie University.
I would like to thank the panel for coming here today and talking about
organized crime. In particular I was interested in Grant Wardlaw’s paper which
I thought was excellent.-
I will recall that he said: “We need more information, more studies, and
we also need some good theory”.
It seems to me that one of the problems in what I would see as the rather
unfortunate response to David Brown’s intervention is that there really has not
been a lot of theory discussed, and that Mr Costigan, being the expert in this
one area, really has no right to dismiss people by calling their intervention
negative and destructive. It seems to me that he might listen and learn
something from those, and there is a signiﬁcant constituency in this room and
also in this State and elsewhere in Australia, who feel that Mr Costigan has been
very very single minded and very dismissive of other people’s ideas in this area
and that he sometimes relies on various propositions, professional ethics
sometimes, to avoid coming into an argument. It seems to me that there is an
argument here, Sir, and I really think rather than seeing the trees all the time
you might attempt to look at the forest.
This is a seminar on organized crime and therefore not simply about drugs.
I acknowledge that you talked about white collar crime to begin with. The fact
is, it seems to me, that organized crime is about powerful people and
institutions. Thus if we take the idea of an ongoing organization, hierarchic,‘
authoritarian, anti-competitive, willing to use force, coercion, fraud, corruption,
involved in transport and so forth, then we begin to understand who are
amongst the sort of people I would include, and also the sort of people you are
talking about. There is a wide range of organized crime in this State and country
and if you talk about the despoilation of the Australian countryside, if you talk
about pollution, if you talk about worker’s health and safety, if you talk about
a whole range of anti-social behaviour it seems to me what we have to do is
begin to think of this, as Dave Brown was suggesting, in a serious and
theoretical way. It seems to me that the drug problem is really a kind of side
issue which can in many ways be dealt with through the education of the public
and law reform, but that we ought here to be talking about the sort of thing
that I have just described: organization crime with its cover of legitimacy and
patterns and structures of corruption.
What we have to avoid is the kind of negative despair that you are now
suffering. I would like to do something for you. It seems to me that that despair
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comes from seeing so much empirical data and not being able to put it together
into some kind of framework. The fact is that this State that we live in is run
by and has been run by governments that were up to their ears in organized
crime. Organized crime has existed for God knows how long within the police—
we do not have to have a Royal Commission to tell us that. If you want to talk
about transport and fraud and coercion and so forth just think about what is
being done to the city of Sydney, think about what you can get away with in
this city, and in this State, and in this country if you have money and empires
of inﬂuence, connections right up to the top. You say: Why is this happening
at the Federal level? Why isn’t the State government doing this? It is clear to
us why they are not doing it. It is organized crime and they are up to their ears
in it: they are involved in it.
It seems to me that what Dave Brown was suggesting, and he should not
have been dismissed under the pretence of not understanding what he was ~
talking about and certainly not have been rubbished by being told he was only
negative and destructive, was a serious attempt to enter into a struggle to
reconstruct the question that we came to discuss, that is organized crime. It
sees to me that it ill behoves someone who has all the information that you
have, Mr Costigan, to simply say that your point of view is correct, and dismiss
anybody else, particularly an academic, who attempts to bring in any kind of
theoretical perspective about what is happening. We cannot see what is
happening. You describe the drugs, the money trail and all that. I have no
problem .with these descriptive contributions; but let us think seriously about
how we want to use that data. What is really going on and what is going to be
happening in ten years time if we simply follow your advice to concentrate on
getting extra powers, taking action on this one area while the whole population
is allowed to suffer under the kinds of organized crime to which I have referred.
Today we have a situation in which politicians, corporate crooks, lawyers,
accountants, doctors, and who knows who else is involved. It seems to me we
really have to think seriously about the direction we are trying to go in.
Historically it has been very clear that law and order campaigns, campaigns
around a perceived evil, campaigns built around the moral panics (to which
Grant Wardlaw refers), that it is those campaigns that allow us really to lose
our liberties,‘really to lose our countryside, our fauna, our children, and
everything else that we would like to retain. I would like to hear some serious
response, not some dismissive snide comment, from the panel.
Frank Costigan, -Q. C.
I have to be very careful because if I let my tongue run way I will be
accused of being ﬂippant. It is a serious subject and when I say this I am not
being ﬂippant. I do in fact agree with about two thirds of what Mr Boehringer
has just said which isa marked improvement on my reaction on what David
Brown said. I do find it odd that there seems to be some suggestion that it is
perfectly alright for people like David Brown, and I use him as a symbol rather
than as a person, to accuse me of being negative and destructive but there is
something wrong in my saying that about him. Maybe he is right and I am
wrong, or vice versa, but I have a point of view about these matters and I am
entitled to express them. If I happen to think that a certain thing is nonsense
then I have no inhibitions about saying so.
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My despair really is not as a result of the things that I have seen over the
last four or ﬁve years, although it must play some part in it, my real despair is
that no one will listen to me; I was, in fact about to speak about the
concentration that the discussion has taken about drugs. The drug trade is a
very serious matter in this country, but it is only one aspect of organized crime.
There are many other matters that were mentioned by Mr Boehringer that are
important. Indeed of the 4 000 pages in my Reports I would think no more
than at the most a quarter, and I suspect a good deal less than that, were
concerned with drugs. They were concerned with the whole range of the items
that were referred to by Mr Boehringer and they are very important. Where I
do take umbrage with you is the suggestion that I am hiding behind some
professional ethics in not dealing with matters of criticism. I can tell you ifI
had been able to there. are a number of things I would have wished to say in
the greatest detail about events that occurred, not in this State, in the early
weeks after this Commission ﬁnished and I feel a considerable inhibition in not
being able to talk about those matters but I cannot. You may sneer at my
professional ethics if youwill. I am the sufferer by that not you.
Matthew Goode
One of the things that uplifts my soul about “conﬁscation of criminal
proﬁts” as an area is that I know that while the discussion has been about drugs,
and I am perfectly happy for it to be about drugs, I can see it extending to all
indictable offences and maybe even some summary offences if you use S.P.
bookies as that. If we get that, then we get a generalized offence and we can
start looking at polluting companies, we can start looking at people who pull
down buildings illegally in the middle of the night, and we can look at
Medifraud and consumer rip-offs but don’t tell ’em Gill because if you do they
might actually beat us!
Dr Grant Wardlaw
I think Gill Boehringer is absolutely right in stressing the absence of theory
in this debate, and it seems to me the fact that there are not sufficient adequate
theoretical discussions about either the underpinnings, the causes for drug abuse,
or for the way that we try to attack the problem, is one of the most important
reasons why we have the second part of my paper—the moral panic. There is
simply not sufficient theoretical consideration given to what constitutes the drug
problem, why it is a problem, in what sense is it a problem, which drugs are
the problems, if there are any. I think that it is tremendously important that
seminars like this do try and focus particularly in the future on trying to develop
adequate theoretical explanations for some of these matters. I think one of the
reaons it is important to focus on drugs in the debate on organized crime,
particularly in this sort of forum, is my perception that it is a two way thing,
much of the justiﬁcation for the organized crime combative measures is because
it is believed that organized crime is so heavily involved in the drugs ﬁeld and
vice versa. 1 think that we have to concentrate on the drugs ﬁeld to a certain
extent, even though organized crime is a much wider concept and covers a much
wider range of behaviours, because it is the drug section of organized crime
which the public is being continually harangued about and which is being used
as the justiﬁcation for the introduction of a whole lot of meaSures to deal with
organized crime.
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John H. Laurence, Q. C.
It has been said I think seriously that there has not been enough emphasis
on theory. I would submit that we have had far too much theory. I wish to speak
as a practising Barrister who has been around the courts for the best part of
forty years on both sides and I think it is time that we got down to tin tacks to
ﬁght this problem. Currently there is talk about bringing in a Bill of Rights. If
there is constitutional power in the Commonwealth to bring in a Bill of Rights
then there is constitutional power to suspend civil rights. This was done during
the war and that was the only way that we survived that war. I think the only
way that we will survive this drug problem is by suspending civil liberties when -
it comes to people who are arrested, or even suspected, of trafﬁcking in drugs.
The suspension of civil liberties is a very serious matter but it can be done.
The fact that we have between two to ﬁve years delay between arrest and
bringing people to trial for serious drug offences is no good at all. It is too late
by the time people come to trial, guilty or innocent, as if they have made proﬁts
they have got rid of them or dealt with them in such a way that they cannot
be touched by the authorities. I would say there must be “Facilitation of Proof"
sanctions without having to go through all the rigmarole that is necessary in a
trial. If substances examined by a chemist are said to be heroin, then they are
deemed to be heroin until somebody can prove to the contrary.
A modiﬁcation of the hearsay laws is needed to avoid a proliferation of
witnesses. It needs dispensation with certain corroboration where that
corroboration is virtually impossible. Possession of money, or cash, or assets,
without any corresponding business dealing to show that it was come by
honestly should cast an onus of proof on the defendant to say that he came by
them lawfully.
In drug charges involving “Commercial Quantities” of drugs, bail should
be refused or at least there should be a strong onus upon the person charged or
found to be in possession of “Commercial Quantities” to show that he has some
exceptional circumstance which entitles him to bail.
As regards “Conﬁscation of Assets” I submit it is quite simple to overcome
that. All it needs is an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act that conviction of a
serious drug offence would be deemed to be an “Act of Bankruptcy” and be
sufficient foundation for a Sequestration Order to be made.
You might say that some of these are matters which are too drastic, too
draconian, but it is a dangerous situation, I have had quite a lot of experience
in recent years with a Public Hospital which treats drug addicts. I have seen
some friends and some children of friends destroyed by drugs. I understoood
Dr Wardlaw to say “People may use heroin without becoming addicts”. Did I
hear correctly?
Dr Grant Wardlaw
Yes.
John Laurence Q. C.
There is only one word for that, Sir, that is “Bullshit!” One hears that sort
of nonsense talked about cocaine: “sportsmen use it,” “lots of people use it,”
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“it gives them the lift they need for the moment” and “they might not touch
it again for months.” That is absolutely nonsense too, cocaine is becoming as
big a danger as heroin. People indoctrinate students in this way. They are people
who themselves are destroying our youth, and I say they are themselves as guilty
of an offence against the community as are people who are actually trafﬁcking
in drugs.
I do not know the best way to deal with the drug problem but I do know
that the present system is not doing it. The jurisprudential approach is not
sufﬁcient. We must have tough, draconian methods. It is the only way of saving
ourselves.
Dr Grant Ward/aw
I am afraid it is not bullshit. There can be a sensible difference of opinion
on this issue, but I can point to any number of studies that demonstrate that
people do not necessarily become addicts and have a compulsion to use any
drug—heroin, cocaine or any other drug—and I can produce mountains of
' scientiﬁc evidence to substantiate that point of view. I can only disagree totally
with the general tenor of the last speaker’s remarks and say that in those
jurisdictions which have attempted some of the draconian suspension of civil
liberties that the speaker suggests there is still no evidence that they have
managed to reduce their drug problems to what they considered even themselves
to be manageable proportions. I still have yet to see the evidence that that sort
of apprOach can even theoretically achieve the ends that are proposed for it.
Frank Costigan, Q. C.
I did not realise I was going to be given another opportunity to say
anything more but having lifted the veil from my private life for a couple of
hours tonight I look forward to resuming my practice at the Victorian Bar
tomorrow morning.
There is a problem about the concept of organised crime, and there is an
enormous problem as to how you deal with it. It is a problem which is often
articulated by some people that you have to prove that the problem exists before
we do anything about it and require a standard of proof which is appropriate
to a criminal trial. The fact of the matter is that there have been endless
enquiries over the last ten or ﬁfteen years, and I exclude mine completely, all
of which have come to the same kind of conclusions about the existence of the
problems in this community. I have seen a good deal of their conﬁdential
material, as you might expect, and I have seen my own conﬁdential material,
and there is a lot of evidence which justiﬁes the public conclusions, although
there are some inhibitions about revealing that evidence. It is time that we
moved off the search for determining what the problem was on to the search
to doing something about it. That is why I think that ultimately the creation of
the National Crime Authority with all the defects that I believe the legislation
has did represent a national attempt to do something about the problem. The
view I have is that ultimately it will be seen that that solution was not really
sufﬁcienly geared up to do it but nonetheless it is moving along the right track.
The difﬁculty about talking about organized crime is that it does cover such an
enormous span of activities. It does not require a two and a half hour seminar
— it requires a four week seminar probably with less people here. I might say,
and it is not in the slightest bit patronising, that I would be delighted to spend
some days at that seminar with David Brown while we sorted out some of our
 
  
80
problems, because I suspect that you often ﬁnd when you get two people who
at ﬁrst thrust seem to be antagonistic one hundred per cent that the areas of
difference may not be so great after all. '
ﬁlm
I: «slim—mun
 The following Proceedings have been published and are available for sale at
the Government Priming Office. 390-422 Harris Street. Ultimo
and the Government Information Centre. Cnr. Hunter & Elizabeth Streets. Sydney.
.-l// enquiries to: The Government Primer. I’. 0. Box 75. Pyrmonl. NS. 11'. 2009. Australia.
1967 1 Sentencing. Fitness to Plead.
l968(l) 2 Adolescent and the 'Law. Treat or Punish?
1968(2) 3 Computers and the Lawyer. ~
1968(3) 4. Drug Abuse in New South Wales.
1969(1) 5. Judicial Seminar on Sentencing. Sentencing Project, Part I.
1969(2) 6 Sexual Offences against Females.
1969(3) 7 Bail.
1970(1) 8 Abortion.
91970(2) . Male Sex Olfences in Public Places.
1970(3) 10. Sentencing Project: Part 11, Probation.
1971(1) 11. Parole of Prisoners Act 1966.
1971(2) 12. Social Defence.
1971(3) 13. Road Safety.
1972(1) 14. Psychiatric Service for the Penal System.
1972(2) 15. Armed Robbery.
1973 16. Sentencing to Imprisonment — Primary Deterrent or Last Resort?
1973 . 17. The Right to Silence.
1974 18. Police Questioning and Confessional Statements.
1974 19. Corporate Crime.
1974 20. The Protection of Children.
1974 21. An Examination of the Parole of Prisoners in N.S.W. — our ofprim.
1975 22. Proposed Amendments to the N.S.W. Mental Health Act (1958).
1975 23. White Collar Crime — Can the Courts Handle It?
1975 24. Motoring Offences.
I975 25. Compensation and Restitution for Victims of Crime.
1976 26. Parole in Practice in N.S.W.
1976 27. Treatment of Children Associated with Crime.
1976 28. Corporate Crime (No. 2).
1976 29. Complaints Against Police.
1977 30. Probation.
1977 31. Bail (No. 2)._
1977 32. The Dangerous Offender — Prediction and Assessment.
1977 33. A Diversion Programme for Drinking Drivers.
I978 34. Rights of the Mentally Ill.
1978 35. Sentencing (1978) — 0m ofprim.
1978 36. Unemployment and Crime — 0m ofprinl.
1979 37. White Collar Crime (No. 2).
1979 38. State. Direction & Future of Corrections.
Part 11 — Alternatives to Imprisonment.
I979 39. State. Direction & Future of Corrections: Pan 1 — Prisons — out ofprim.
1979 40, Crime and the Family — Some Aspects of the Report of the Royal
Commission on Human Relationships — om ofprim.
1979 41. The Problem of Crime in a Federal System.
1980 42. Problems of Delay in Criminal Proceedings.
1980 43. Police Discretion in the Criminal Process.
1980 44. Aboriginals and the Criminal Law — 0m ofprim.
I980 45. Victims of Crime.
1980 46, Index — Volumes 1—36,
1981 47. The Old as Offenders and Victims of Crime.
1981 48. Criminal Evidence Law Reform.
I981 49. Child Welfare in the ‘805.
I981 50. Crime and the Professions: the Provision of Medical Services]
1982 51. Community Justice Centres — out qurim.
1982 52. Costs and Beneﬁts in Planning Crime Prevention.
1982 53. The Criminal Trial on Trial.
1982 54. Domestic Violence (including Child Abuse and Incest).
I983 55. Crime and the Professions: The Legal Profession.
I983 56. Street Offences.
1983 57. Shoplifting.
I983 58. A National Crimes Commission?
1984 59. Computer Related Crime.
1984 60. Offender Management in the ‘805.
I984 61. Incest.
1984 62. Illegally Obtained Evidence.
1985 63. Index - Volumes 1—60.
1985 64. Gun Control.
1985 65. Drugs and Crime.
1985 66. ' Crime and the Professions — The Accountancy Profession.
